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THE MOMENTUM OF POSTHUMOUS
CONCEPTION: A MODEL ACT
Raymond C. O'Brien*
INTRODUCTION
As much as the law seeks to provide certainties, human evolution
illustrates the continuity of uncertainty. John Stuart Mill was prescient when
he observed: "There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is
assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life."' Today, in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, twenty-five years after the inauguration
of The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy at the Columbus
School of Law of The Catholic University of America, the law wrestles with
the legal uncertainties spawned by advances in medical technology enabling
posthumous conception. A quarter-century ago, medical procedures
allowing for conception to occur long after the death of the providers of
sperm, egg or embryos were nascent at best. Today, it is possible to bring
about human posthumous conception for decades after death, challenging
myriad laws of paternity, inheritance, and economic benefits all associated
with paternity or maternity. State and federal statutes seek to provide
certainty of disposition, but at present we are still gathering momentum,
seeking some assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. The latest
development in this search is the Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology [hereinafter Model Act], dated February 2008,
and approved by the American Bar Association to provide guidance to the
states. The Model Act encompasses far more than posthumous conception,
but offers a benchmark for all that is to come.
When an infant is born following conception, federal and state statutes,
and concomitant case law, have sought to provide certainty in the following
situations: (1) establishing paternity because each child deserves a parent;
(2) identifying heirs for inheritance benefits, both under state intestate
statutes3 and to comply with the wishes of testators and settlors in the
* Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America;
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 37 (London, John W. Parker & Son, West
Strand, 2d ed. 1859).
2. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
3. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (2006), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upc/final2OO5.pdf ("Any part of decedent's
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implementation of wills and trusts; and (3) structure qualifications for
federal and state benefits, such as Social Security, Medicaid, or any of the
child support guidelines. When conception and birth occurred only through
sexual intercourse, and children were born within three hundred days of
conception, these three goals were achievable within existing laws.
Nonetheless, medical advances in assisted reproductive technologies have
developed so rapidly that statutory law no longer provides certainty. Today,
with an objective vacuum, courts have sought to provide a modicum of
judicial assurance of equity and reason until such time as legislatures may
accommodate the evolution of human procreation possibilities beyond the
realm of only sexual intercourse. Each of the judicial decisions to be
discussed that address the issue of posthumous conception, although few in
number, speak to the need of statutory certainty. These decisions offer a
judicial interim response; the Model Act contributes to the momentum,
suggesting that the states now address the issues raised with statutes of their
own, specifically in reference to posthumous conception.
Posthumous conception may be defined as "the transfer of an embryo or
gametes with the intent to reproduce a live birth after a gamete provider has
died.,, 4 The procedure is a form of assisted reproductive technology (ART)
that encompasses any scientific intervention to bring about a human live
birth but is now meant to apply only to conception leading to birth after the
death of the gamete provider. Hence the term: posthumous conception.
This is not the same as artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization. In an
effort to provide clarity, and to distinguish this process from artificial
insemination, the Supreme Court of Arkansas described in vitro fertilization
as follows:
After the woman has taken injectable ovulation-inducing medications
... multiple oocytes are retrieved from the woman's ovaries by a
minor surgical procedure. The oocytes are placed in a petri dish with
estate not effectively disposed of by will passes by intestate succession to the decedent's
heirs as prescribed .... "). For legal issues involved in testate and intestate succession,
see James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues Raised by the
Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 743 (1998).
4. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102. A "gamete" means "a
cell containing a haploid complement of DNA that has the potential to form an embryo
when combined with another gamete. Sperm and eggs are gametes. A gamete may
consist of nuclear DNA from one human being combined with the cytoplasm, including
cytoplasmic DNA, of another human being." Id. See generally CHARLES P. KINDREGAN,
JR. & MAUREEN McBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE
TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE (ABA 2006); Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, A
Primer on Posthumous Conception and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38
WASHBURN L.J. 599 (1999).
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her male partner's sperm (in vitro) and placed in an incubator for
fertilization to occur. The embryos are allowed to grow for a period
of three to five days before they are placed back into the woman's
uterus.
5
Conception after the death of the gamete provider is distinguishable from
when sperm and egg (ova) create an embryo through in vitro fertilization
during the lifetime of a gamete provider. Arguably, whenever sperm and
egg create an embryo, conception occurs. Obviously, this may occur during
the lifetimes of the gamete providers, and furthermore, if the birth of a child
occurs as a result of this procedure, existing statutes would provide
protection and eligibility because the resulting child will be born within the
statutory period of time. But if conception occurs during the lifetime of the
gamete provider, but implantation does not occur until after the death of one
or both of the providers, then the birth of the resulting child would not be
provided protection or eligibility under almost all existing statutes. This is
the focus of posthumous conception.
There are two sets of circumstances that delineate the difference between
posthumous conception and established, protected conception. One is when
the conception occurs in an artificial environment, the conception-union of
sperm and egg--occurring through in vitro fertilization and the resulting
embryo remains outside of a gestational carrier or intended mother.
Presumptively, the embryo is implanted after the death of one or both of the
providers of the gametes. This is one set of circumstances and encompasses
posthumous conception. Of course sperm may be taken from cryopreserved
sperm deposited from a male provider, or even from a recently deceased
male. Once taken, the sperm could be used for conception in a female. This
also would be posthumous conception as the male provider has predeceased
the conception.
Under a second set of circumstances the embryo may be implanted into
the womb of a woman during the lifetime of the male gamete provider with
the intention of carrying the embryo to term. This set of circumstances
better envisions the context of the existing paternity and probate statutes.
The difficulty facing the courts and legislatures today is trying to
accommodate the first set of circumstances, posthumous conception, into the
latter one envisioned by present-day statutes. Each statute must be read
closely to see which set of circumstances is contemplated. Undoubtedly, if
conception and implantation occur prior to the death of the gamete provider
and a child results, the infant would qualify for paternity, inheritance, and
benefits from the gamete providers. The resulting child would qualify as "in
existence." Such circumstances would not encompass posthumous
conception, but they do prompt considerations of paternity and ownership
5. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 n.2 (Ark. 2008) (quoting 17-289
ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 289.81 (3d ed. 2007)).
The Momentum of Posthumous Conception
* 6 7issues. These issues are addressed by the Uniform Parentage Act and are
outside the scope of posthumous conception and this Article. Notably, these
issues have not gone unnoticed, as scholars, ethicists and moralists struggle
with the implications prompted by the new assisted reproductive
technologies.
8
This Article addresses the scenario of when, through advanced medical
technology, a procedure is performed resulting in the birth of a child more
than three hundred days-a time suggested by some statutes-after the death
of the gamete provider.9 The embryo may result from in vitro fertilization or
6. See, e.g., In re Kievemagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311 (Cal. C. App. 2008) (holding
that agreement husband had with the cryopreservation storage facility to destroy his
sperm after his death manifested his express intent and the husband's intent takes
precedence over any rights of the wife to that sperm); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J.
2001) (noting that a husband and wife created seven preembryos while married and then
prior to implantation divorced and the issue was how to dispose of the preembryos. The
court enforced the terms of the agreement as this will allow for reliance by the parties and
the clinics involved.); In re Dahl and Angle, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. App. 2008) (involving six
cryopreserved frozen embryos created during marriage under an agreement executed by
the couple with the storage facility that the embryos could be destroyed upon the
dissolution of the marriage. The former wife had the authority under the agreement to
determine disposition of the embryos and she ordered their destruction. The court
affirmed, holding that it was just and proper to give effect to the agreement executed by
the parties); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that a woman who
consented to the in vitro fertilization of ova donated from another woman and sperm
contributed by her boyfriend was the legal mother of the three children that resulted from
the embryos that had been implanted in her and that she had carried to term).
7. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 201-204 (2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretative
Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000)
(proposing an "interpretive methodology" to legal parentage determinations); Stacey
Sutton, The Real Sexual Revolution: Posthumously Conceived Children, 73 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 857 (1999) (cataloging the many methods of assisted reproductive technology);
Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Reproductive
Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55 (1994)
(suggesting changes in the law to accommodate reproductive opportunities).
9. For a complete description of all of the factual permeations, see Ruth Zafran,
Dying to be a Father: Legal Paternity in Cases of Posthumous Conception, 8 HOus. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 51-55 (2007), listing: (1) woman wishing to use sperm
cryopreserved prior to the man's death; (2) conception occurs through the use of sperm
retrieved soon after the man's death; (3) another person, because of a relationship with
the mother, wishes to be declared the parent of her child conceived through the sperm of
another man; and (4) the deceased woman's eggs may also be the subject of posthumous
conception, either cryopreserved prior to her death or retrieved shortly after she dies.
2009
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from a woman being artificially inseminated with the sperm of a deceased
male gamete provider. And of course the woman could have predeceased
too and left a viable ova, that was then fertilized with the sperm of a living
or a deceased male to create an embryo, which was then placed into a
surrogate, a gestational carrier. The essential element is that the act, which
results in a future birth, occurs after the death of one or both of the gamete
providers. This is the essence of posthumous conception. That is, once the
egg and sperm are brought together through assisted reproductive
technology to form an embryo, both or either of the persons who donated the
sperm and egg or embryo are dead, perhaps for a long time. If this is the
point of conception, then the issue arises as to whether the resulting
posthumously conceived infant should qualify under the law for paternity,
inheritance and benefits. How long should the law wait for conception
before terminating status? The law strives for certainty and medical
technology has made certainty an elusive prey.
This all sounds very complicated because human experience has so few
introductions to these possibilities. Not too long ago the issues involving
posthumous conception would not have occurred because the medical
technology was not there to allow for it. But today, with technological
advances each day, it is estimated that there are hundreds of thousands of
cryopreserved embryos in the United States alone. 10 Moreover, it is possible
that sperm, eggs and embryos may be preserved for more than fifty years.
Undoubtedly, continuing medical advances will extend the life-spans of
embryos and other genetic materials. So too, the reasons why men and
women wish to preserve them will multiply in parallel to the complexities of
modem life. The admonitions concerning the ethics 12 or morality of assisted
10. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39
FAM. L.Q. 579, 579 n.l (2005); see generally Sharona Hoffman & Andrew P. Morriss,
Birth After Death: Perpetuities and the New Reproductive Technologies, 38 GA. L. REv.
575, 595 (2004) (stating that there are 400,000 frozen embryos stored in the United
States); Robert J. Kerekes, My Child ... But Not My Heir: Technology, the Law, and
Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213 (1996); E. Donald Shapiro &
Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem
Insemination, I J. L. & HEALTH 229 (1986-87) (discussing the legal and scientific history
of artificial insemination).
11. Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 10, at 579 n.1.
12. See, e.g., G. Bahadur, Ethical Challenges in Reproductive Medicine: Posthumous
Reproduction, 1266 INT'L CONGRESS SERIES 295 (2004) (recommending that legislatures
exercise caution in allowing for posthumous conception and should balance all of the
interests at stake); Andrea Corvalan, Fatherhood After Death: A Legal and Ethical
Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 335 (1997); Katheryn D.
Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and Utilizing Gametes from
the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289 (2006); R. Landau, Posthumous Sperm
Retrieval for the Purpose of Later Insemination or IVF in Israel: An Ethical and
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reproductive technology need to be taken very seriously,' 3 but the genie is
out of the bottle and this is the world in which we now live. The decisional
law we are about to discuss reveals how uncertain society is regarding how
to address the paternity, inheritance or benefits associated with the
posthumously conceived infant.
14
Psychosocial Critique, 19:9 HuM. REPROD. 1952 (2004) (arguing that posthumously
taking sperm to fertilize an egg exploits the dead and does a disservice to the resulting
child); M. Parker, Response to Orr and Siegler-Collective Intentionality and Procreative
Desires: The Permissible View on Consent to Posthumous Conception, 30 J. MED. ETHICS
389 (2004) (arguing for a presumption that the decedent intended to use gametes for
posthumous conception and only an explicit prohibition would prohibit use for
procreation).
13. Pope Benedict XVI, in addressing the General Assembly of the Pontifical
Academy for Life, reaffirmed the position of the Roman Catholic Church that the
"Magisterium of the Church has constantly proclaimed the sacred and inviolable
character of every human life from its conception until its natural end .... This moral
judgment also applies to the origins of the life of an embryo even before it is implanted in
the mother's womb, which will protect and nourish it for nine months until the moment
of birth." Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Participants at the Twelfth General
Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life and Congress on "The Human Embryo in
the Pre-Implantation Phase," (Feb. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict xvi/speeches/2006/february/documents/hf-b
en-xvispe_20060227_embrione-umano en.html. More recently, the Vatican's
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, issued an instruction titled Instruction
Dignitas Personae On Certain Bioethical Questions rejecting in vitro fertilization,
destruction of human embryos, freezing of embryos, freezing of oocytes, and
intracytoplasmic sperm injection. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH,
INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE ON CERTAIN BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS (2008) [hereinafter
INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE], available at http://www.usccb.org/comm/
Dignitaspersonae/DignitasPersonae.pdf. For additional comments on religious
perspectives, see generally Nigel M. De S. Cameron, Pandora's Progeny: Ethical Issues
in Assisted Human Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 745, 752 (2005) (noting that the Roman
Catholic Church opposes assisted reproductive technology because it is "an improper
intrusion into the marital bond . . . [and is] contrary to the unity of marriage, to the
dignity of the spouses, to the vocation proper to parents, and the child's right to be
conceived and brought into the world in marriage and from marriage."); Helen Alvare,
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, United States Catholic Conference of
Catholic Bishops (2007), available at http://www.usccb.org/prolife/programs/rlp/
Alvare.pdf (detailing the Church's moral objections to assisted reproductive
technologies).
14. For a discussion of some of the legal issues arising from reproductive technology
see, for example, Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93 (1996); Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A
Dialogue in Postmortem Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HoUs.
L. REV. 967 (1996) (arguing that if support is required then inheritance rights should flow
2009
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The Model Act, recently approved by the American Bar Association,
"does not either advocate or oppose the use of [advanced reproductive]
technologies, but accepts the reality that they are being used by many people
today and proposes legal solutions and protections for those involved.' 5
Nonetheless, using the Model Act as a precipitating vehicle, this Article
recommends further steps that may be taken to accommodate persons who
harbor sincerely held objections to the medical technology now available to
reproductive clinics. Indeed, the Model Act addresses the issues
surrounding the use of assisted reproductive technology and, if nothing
more, offers an initial step toward comprehensive regulation of various
practices. The practices include (1) transfers and dispositions of embryos,
(2) parental status issues, (3) surrogacy arrangements, (4) payments to
donors and gestational carriers, (5) infertility and insurance coverage, (6)
regulations of the clinics and storage facilities, and (7) management to
safeguard the privacy of health information. 16  While still grappling for
acceptable modes of regulation, the continuing evolution of technology
poses continuing challenges.
If initially human and social progress was characterized primarily by
industrial developments and the production of consumer goods, today
from this); Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem
Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521 (1993) (anticipating the issues generated by
posthumous conception and offering suggestions for their solution); Kerekes, supra note
10 (suggesting the adoption of a uniform act); Laurence C. Nolan, Posthumous
Conception: A Private or Public Matter?, 11 BYU J. PuB. L. 1 (1997) (suggesting greater
state control over posthumous conception); Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the
Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REv. 901 (1997) (offering
moral and legal considerations); Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies:
Legal Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL
MED. 547 (1996) (discussing taxpayer responsibility for issues raised by posthumous
conception); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002); Melissa B.
Vegter, The "ART" of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation Requiring Proof of
Parental Intent Before Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from a Deceased
Parent 's Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 267 (2003); Bruce L. Wilder, Assisted Reproduction
Technology: Trends and Suggestions for the Developing Law, 18 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 177 (2002) (suggesting that courts should not restrict parentage to
biology but instead to "legally significant acts").
15. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., at Report to the American
Bar Association (2008). The American Bar Association does oppose the use of cloning
for human reproduction, see 129 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
571-76 (2004).
16. See generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law
of ART. The New American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 203 (2008).
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it is distinguished by developments in information technologies,
research in genetics, medicine and biotechnologies for human benefit,
which are areas of great importance for the future of humanity, but in
which there are also evident and unacceptable abuses.
1 7
This Article is an assessment of the law concerning posthumous
conception, noting that this is a very recent development prompted by
significant advances in medical technology. This topic was chosen to honor
all who have edited, supported and published within The Journal of
Contemporary Health Law and Policy for the last twenty-five years. The
topic of posthumous conception demonstrates the need and utility of such
prestigious health law journals, illustrating that this is an issue that has
immense personal and economic consequences today but was not clearly
envisioned at the time of the Journal's inception. In tribute, this Article will
first, briefly describe the evolution of assisted reproductive technologies that
allow for human posthumous conception. Second, this Article will discuss
the existing cases and how the courts have defined the issues and resulting
common law to provide a solution to the need for certainty. Third, statutes
that have been proposed and even adopted will be discussed. Lastly, in
conclusion, this Article will offer some suggestions as to the future of the
debate.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Posthumous conception has evolved from the practice of artificial
insemination, which, "in itself is not new, having been performed on animals
for centuries, the first recorded successful human artificial insemination was
performed in England in 1770."' "By 1986, it was estimated that as many
as 20,000 women each year were artificially inseminated in the United
States." 19 In an article that was descriptive of artificial conception-assisted
reproductive technology-as well as cautionary as to the legal challenges the
procedure prompts, Professor Walter Wadlington wrote in 1983 that
"artificial insemination (AI) today is a widely accepted, nonexperimental
medical procedure."20 In his article, Professor Wadlington describes three
17. INSTRUCTION DIGNTAS PERSONAE, supra note 13, at 22.
18. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting
E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of
Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1986-87)).
19. Id. at 285 (citing Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 n.1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986)). For additional information on assisted reproductive technology, see West
Key Numbers: 285 (Parent and Child); and 285k20 (Assisted Reproduction; Surrogate
Parenting).
20. Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69
VA. L. REv. 465, 468 (1983).
2009
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distinct procedures: (1) heterologous artificial insemination, where a woman
is impregnated with semen from a man not her husband; (2) homologous
artificial insemination, where a married woman is impregnated with the
semen of her husband when normal copulation fails because of various
medical issues; and (3) combined artificial insemination, where a married
woman is inseminated with a mixture of her husband's and a donor's
sperm. 21 Commenting on the availability of long-term storage capabilities,
an important factor in eventual posthumous conception, Professor
Wadlington noted that: "Through modem cryogenic capabilities, semen can
be frozen and stored for future use in sperm banks. Some banks operate as
commercial enterprises, though, unlike their counterparts in the financial
field, they are virtually free from state licensing and other regulation. 22
Even though sperm could be cryopreserved, eggs and certainly embryos
were more delicate. During the last two decades of the twentieth century,
the viability of frozen embryos produced from sperm and ova was
considered risky and unlikely to survive thawing and implantation,23 and
there were always concerns about an increased risk of recessive genetic
defects. 24  Scientific advances continued, however, and with the
achievement of the ability to preserve sperm and embryos, legal issues
began to surface. The first judicial controversy regarding posthumous
conception may well have occurred in Louisiana in 1994. The case
involved an infant girl, Judith Christine Hart, bom more than one year after
the death of her father, Edward Hart. When a claim was made to provide the
minor child with Social Security benefits due as a result of her father's
death, the Social Security Administration rejected the claim but later
rescinded its ruling and permitted the child to receive benefits without the
26
necessity of a court ruling. The case provided little momentum, but
21. Id.at468-69.
22. Id. at 468.
23. See, e.g., Embryos' Fate Weighed After Couple's Death, WASH. POST, June 18,
1984, at A4.
24. See, e.g., John D. Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Human
Beings, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 336, 341 (1981). Indeed, modem legal decisions
concerning artificial conception comment upon the fact that "[e]gg cells must be
fertilized before undergoing cryopreservation because unfertilized cells are difficult to
preserve and, once preserved, are difficult to fertilize." J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 709
(N.J. 2001).
25. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions:
Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 251, 251 & n.l (1999) (citing Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint at 5, Hart
v. Shalala (E.D. La. 1994) (No. 94-3944) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review)).
26. For additional commentary on the case, see id.
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indicates that the issue of posthumous conception was surfacing as a distinct
possibility.
In late 1991, the important case of Hecht v. Superior Court was initiated
in Los Angeles involving the right of a man to bequeath cryopreserved
sperm to his girlfriend for the purpose of posthumous conception.27 The
decedent, William E. Kane, had committed suicide a few months before, but
prior to doing so, had deposited fifteen vials of his sperm with California
Cryobank, Inc., in Los Angeles. His will bequeathed the sperm to his long-
time girlfriend, Deborah Ellen Hecht, with instructions that indicated he
wished her to use the sperm to impregnate herself if she wished, thereby
giving tacit consent to posthumous conception. But Mr. Kane's two existing
children from a previous marriage objected to Ms. Hecht inheriting the
sperm of their father, arguing that this would jeopardize the existing family
by injecting after-born children into their stable family. Plus, any after-born
children would never have a traditional family because they would never
know their father. And finally, since Mr. Kane and Ms. Hecht were never
married it was a violation of public policy for Ms. Hecht to become pregnant
with his sperm.
28
In 1993, the Hecht court issued an opinion that was both innovative and
illustrative of succeeding issues to arise with posthumous conception. In
allowing Ms. Hecht to have access to the sperm for possible posthumous
conception, the court held that:
Sperm which is stored by its provider with the intent that it be used
for artificial insemination is ... unlike other human tissue because it
is 'gametic material' . . . that can be used for reproduction .... [T]he
value of sperm lies in its potential to create a child after fertilization,
growth, and birth. We conclude that at the time of his death, decedent
had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had
decision making authority as to the use of his sperm for reproduction.
Such interest is sufficient to constitute 'property' within the meaning
of [the Probate Code]. 29
As property, the decedent had the right to bequeath it under his last will and
testament to Ms. Hecht.
In concluding that sperm is property even though it is gamete material, the
court, by implication, provided the same status to other reproductive
materials, all of which will eventually find their way into the current legal
paradigm of posthumous conception. 30 The Hecht court does make mention
27. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
28. Id. at 279.
29. Id. at 283.
30. See infra Part I1 (discussing cases that specifically address issues raised under
posthumous conception).
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of post-mortem artificial insemination, discussing a French decision, the
only one at the time, Parpalaix v. CECOS decided on August 1, 1984. The
French Tribunal de Grande Instance (T.G.I.) (the ordinary court for civil
litigation) held that the sperm belonged to the man and that his intent is
paramount and must be given effect. But the court concluded that the
inheritance laws of the country were far too complicated to allow for
inheritance by anyone who had not been conceived pre-mortem. Calling for
more modem laws to be enacted by the legislature, the French court
abandoned further discussion and the issue lay dormant until the Hecht
decision.31 The practical implications lay dormant while waiting to see if
Ms. Hecht would posthumously conceive a child using Mr. Kane's sperm.
In 1993, when the California court rendered its decision, Ms. Hecht had
not become pregnant with Mr. Kane's sperm, so the court was not forced to
determine inheritance rights under California law.32  Nonetheless, the
California court, at a minimum, similar to what was decided in France,
certainly implied that the right to posthumously conceive is a viable right.
33
So too, the California court concluded that public policy is not violated by
posthumous conception, even between unmarried persons, and that it creates
no unwarranted obstacles to existing children. Nonetheless, the court
acknowledged the obstacles a posthumously conceived child would face in
seeking to inherit under existing state probate laws. And, of course, the
court called upon the legislature to address the issue.34 This dicta anticipates
the issues, advice, and admonitions of all of the courts to follow.
The Hecht decision was an important decision for many reasons. First,
the court, in holding that reproductive tissue was property, allowed for a
legal apparatus to be utilized to distribute the tissue after death. These
would include a valid last will and testament, various forms of non-probate
transfers, and intestate succession. The point is that the gamete is property
and may be considered protected as such under the United States
31. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 10, at 229-33 (discussing the Parpalaix
case).
32. The California court did order that the sperm be released to Ms. Hecht in 1995,
as she was then forty years of age and her chances of becoming pregnant decreased each
year, thereby causing her irreparable harm to wait. Kane v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d 578, 580-81, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). For further discussion of California law as it
relates to posthumous conception, see Lisa M. Burkdall, A Dead Man's Tale: The Right
to Bequeath Sperm in California, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 875 (1995); Summer A. Johnson,
Chapter 775: Babies with Bucks- Posthumously Conceived Children Receive
Inheritance Rights, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 926 (2005).
33. The California court relied upon the dicta in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
604 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the preferences of the progenitors should guide the court
in the disposition of preembryos).
34. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290-91.
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Constitution. 35 Second, when the court rejected public policy arguments to
prohibit posthumous conception, it permitted an individual's right to private
ordering, self-determination, and a guarantee that the wishes of the provider
would be honored if they met the minimum standards of objective consent.
Third, the court separated the ability to posthumously conceive from the
guarantee that the child born will automatically inherit or receive benefits as
a result of a connection with the provider of the gamete. Thus, as we shall
see in subsequent posthumous conception cases, the establishment of
paternity is simply the first step in the progression of status and inheritance.
Previously, under the Uniform Parentage Act, there was no such distinction
and the long line of Supreme Court decisions guaranteeing equal protection
to non-marital children are seemingly in abeyance. 36 Fourth, by calling upon
the legislature to formulate objective standards for inheritance and provision
of benefits, the court initiated a public debate that is now witnessing some
results.
Rationally, the Hecht decision provides support for posthumous
conception as a theory even though Deborah Hecht never put the theory to a
test by bearing the child of William Kane. But the possibility has borne fruit
in subsequent judicial decisions, be they generated by cryopreserved sperm
or by postmortem removal of the sperm from the decedent. In these cases,
state courts, left with little legislative guidance, sought to develop a judicial
response to petitions to provide for inheritance and/or Social Security
benefits commensurate with the paternity of a deceased father.37 At present
there are few decisions, thus giving the courts and the legislatures additional
35. For a leading case in the protection of a person's right to transmit property at
death, see Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715-16 (1987), holding that this right is just one
stick "in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."
36. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Today,
establishment of paternity in posthumous conception cases is the first step. A claimant
must then prove that "the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the
child." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002). Some states, among the few that have
addressed the issue of posthumous conception, have added a third element to consider in
addition to paternity and consent to parent, that is a time period for any resulting child to
bring a claim. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE §
7648.9 (West Supp. 2009).
37. For a discussion of inheritance and benefit rights, see generally John Doroghazi,
Gillett-Netting v. Bamhart and Unanswered Questions about Social Security Benefits for
Posthumously Conceived Children, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1597 (2005); Johnson, supra note
32; Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 10; Kayla VanCannon, Fathering a Child From
the Grave: What Are The Inheritance Rights of Children Born Through New Technology
After the Death of a Parent?, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 331 (2004).
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time to prepare for increasing petitions that will inevitably occur with
advancing medical technology.
1I. THE DECISIONAL APPROACHES
In addition to the sole international case, Parpalaix, discussed supra, there
are a few federal cases discussing the rights of children in connection with
entitlement to federal benefits in general. 38 One of these cases, decided in
2005, was Stephen v. Commissioner of Social Security.39 The case facts are
unique, although not uncommon, as they involve the removal of sperm from
a decedent for use in conception obviously after his death. But the facts did
not prompt the court's result. Instead, the court based its rejection of the
resulting child's right to Social Security benefits upon the state's intestate
statute. That is, a posthumously conceived child was not entitled to inherit
under the state's intestacy statutes and the only recourse would be for the
decedent to provide for the child in a valid last will and testament. But of
course, this would not result in Social Security benefits--only the state's
unique statute would make that possible. Basing entitlement to Social
Security benefits upon the right of a child to inherit as an intestate child of
the decedent, the court noted that the child was not born until more than
three years after the decedent's death. Because the decedent was a
domiciliary of Florida at the time of his death the court looked to the law of
Florida and found that, "[u]nder Florida law, a child conceived from the
sperm of a person who died before the transfer of sperm to a woman's body
is not eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child has
been provided for by the decedent's will.', 40 The court distinguished the
case of Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, which follows, since in that case Arizona
law did not address the issue of posthumously conceived children by statute.
The Stephen court was thus able to address the rights of the children from
the perspective of whether the children were presumed to be legitimate.
Since the children were deemed to be legitimate, there was no controversy as
38. Relevant West Key Numbers are 356A (Social Security and Public Welfare);
356Ak4.10 (Eligibility and Right to Benefits; Termination); and 356Akl37 (Children in
General).
39. 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (discussing facts where a wife removed
sperm from her husband for posthumous conception after his death from an apparent
heart attack).
40. Id. at 1264 (citing FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (1993): "A child conceived from the eggs
or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or
preembryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's
estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's will.")
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to whether the children would be able to inherit intestate from the deceased
parent under the state's statute.
41
In Gillette-Netting v. Barnhart,42 another federal decision and this time
from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held that the ability to
inherit under the state's intestacy laws was irrelevant. The court held that
posthumously conceived children were entitled to inherit from the decedent
as long as the children were legitimate under the state's laws.43 They thus
made a distinction between the right to inherit intestate and the right to be
considered legitimate, a distinction rejected by the Social Security
Administration. 44  This could have vast implications for eventual
establishment of rights for posthumously conceived children if other courts
similarly make legitimacy the test instead of intestate eligibility.
The facts in Gillett-Netting were illustrative of other posthumous
conception cases. The mother and father of the children were married and
attempting to have children but they encountered fertility problems and were
working with a clinic. Subsequently the father was diagnosed with cancer
41. Id. at 1265. For additional information on terms and cases involving intestate
succession, see relevant West Key Numbers: 124 (Descent and Distribution); 12411
(Persons Entitled and Their Respective Shares); 12411(A) (Heirs and Next of Kin);
124k25 (Descendants); 124k27 (Posthumous Children); 92k3510 (Wills, Probate,
Inheritance, and Dower Issues); and 76Hk88 (Proceedings for Exclusion from Inheritance
or Succession). For a general description of inheritance rights of heirs in general, see
generally Joseph H. Karlin, "Daddy Can You Spare a Dime?": Intestate Heir Rights of
Posthumously Conceived Children, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 1317 (2006); Brianne M. Star, A
Matter of Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L. REv. 613 (2004)
(describing the rights of the state, the child, and the decedent in reference to inheritance).
42. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally Doroghazi, supra note 37
(proposing amending the Social Security law to eliminate dependency on state statutes);
Karen Minor, Posthumously Conceived Children and Social Security Survivor 's Benefits:
Implications of the Ninth Circuit's Novel Approach for Determining Eligibility in Gillett-
Netting v. Barnhart, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 85 (2005); Ann-Patton Nelson, A New
Era of Dead-Beat Dads: Determining Social Security Survivor Benefits for Children Who
Are Posthumously Conceived, 56 MERCER L. REv. 759 (2005); Posthumously Conceived
Children Aren't Entitled to Survivor Benefits, 29 BNA FAM. L. REP. 1075 (2002).
43. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597-98. To review the briefs presented in the case,
see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-15442), 2003 WL 22717238; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Gillett-Netting
v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15442), 2003 WL 22717244.
44. The Social Security Administration takes the position that to be a "child" within
the terms of the Act, an after-conceived child must be able to inherit under state intestate
statutes. See Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart;
Application of State Law and the Social Security Act in Determining Eligibility for a
Child Conceived by Artificial Means after an Insured Individual's Death - Title II of the
Social Security Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).
2009
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXV:332
and, having been warned about possible sterility due to the chemotherapy
treatment, the father cryopreserved sperm for later use by his wife.45 The
father eventually died from the cancer on February 4, 1995, and ten months
later his former wife ordered the in vitro fertilization of the sperm and her
eggs. The resulting embryos were transferred to her on December 21, 1995.
On August 6, 1996, two children were born, Juliet and Piers.46 Two weeks
later the mother filed an application for Social Security benefits based on the
father's earnings, but the application was denied by the Social Security
Administration, a decision which was upheld by an administrative law
judge. The judge's reasoning was, in part, that "children conceived after the
wage earner's death cannot be deemed dependent on the wage earner" and
thus do not qualify for Social Security benefits from the wage earner. 47 An
appeal of the ruling was denied by the Social Security Appeals Council,
which was then finalized by the Commissioner.
The mother then filed a complaint in the federal district court, arguing that
the children were being denied due process and equal protection of the law.
48
The district court denied her claim, holding that, "Juliet and Piers do not
qualify for child's insurance benefits because they are not [the father's]
'children' under the Act and they were not dependent on [him] at the time of
his death.",49  The mother then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In its opinion the court acknowledged the technological advances
made by reproductive technology and voiced a common refrain in stating
that state and federal statutes have not kept pace with the possibilities such
as posthumous conception. Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that it was
bound by the current statutes. Under these statutes benefits may be
conferred on children if: (1) a parent dies fully insured; (2) a guardian makes
an application for benefits; (3) the child is unmarried and a minor; and (4)
the child was dependent on the insured wage earner at the time of his
death. 50 There was no state statute in Arizona that specifically addressed
posthumous conception, as there was in Florida under the Stephen decision,
nor was there a specific prohibition in state law prohibiting the two children
from being able to inherit through intestate succession.
In holding that the children may receive the benefits, the court based its
opinion on the definition of the word "child." Because the Social Security
Act allows for a child to be defined broadly as (1) legally adopted, (2) a
45. Gillette-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594.
46. Id. at 595.
47. Id.
48. For additional information as to constitutional claims, see relevant West Key
Numbers: 92 (Constitutional Law); 92XXVI (Equal Protection); 92XXVI(E) (Particular
Issues and Applications).
49. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
50. Id. at 596.
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stepchild for at least nine months before the insured dies, (3) grandchild, (4)
stepgrandchild, (5) equitably adopted child, or (5) a biological child, 51 then a
posthumously conceived child should be considered as deserving of benefits
as well.52 Furthermore, the children do not have to prove dependency at the
time of death of the insured: "It is well-settled that all legitimate children
automatically are considered to have been dependent on the insured
individual, absent narrow circumstances not present in [the] case.",53 Thus,
"[b]ecause Juliet and Piers are [the father's] legitimate children under [the
state's] law, they are deemed dependent under [the Social Security Act] and
need not demonstrate actual dependency." 54 Based on this, the court ordered
a remand to the Commissioner of Social Security for an award of benefits to
the posthumously conceived children.
The Ninth ,Circuit decision made reference to a Massachusetts state
decision in its opinion. 55  The Massachusetts decision, Woodward v.
Commissioner of Social Security,56 involved similar facts to Gillette-Netting.
A man and woman were married and the man was diagnosed with leukemia.
The couple had no children at the time he was diagnosed and so to prepare
for possible sterilization occasioned by the medical treatment, the husband
had sperm medically withdrawn and cryopreserved. This was in 1993.
Shortly thereafter the husband died and the wife was appointed as the
administrator of his estate. In 1995, the wife gave birth to twin girls through
artificial insemination using the husband's sperm. The husband had been
fully insured under the Social Security Act so the wife applied for benefits
for the dependent children. But the Social Security Administrator rejected
her claim because she had not established the paternity of the children - that
they were the children of her deceased husband.5 7 When she appealed the
rejection of benefits, an administrative law judge ruled de novo that the
children did not qualify for benefits. This time the ruling was based on the
51. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 (2008)).
52. Id. at 597.
53. Id. at 598.
54. Id. at 599.
55. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596 n.3 (referring to the state court's decision as
"well-reasoned").
56. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). See generally
Amy L. Komoroski, After Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Services: Where Do
Posthumously Conceived Children Stand in the Line of Descent?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
297 (2002); Renee H. Sekino, Posthumous Conception: The Birth of a New Class, 8 B.U.
J. Sci. & TECH. L. 362 (2002); Susan C. Stevenson-Popp, "I Have Loved You in My
Dreams ": Posthumous Reproduction and the Need for Change in the Uniform Parentage
Act, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 727 (2003); Posthumously Conceived Children are "Issue" of
Deceased Parent, 28 BNA FAM. L. REP. 1099 (2002).
57. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260.
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fact that the children were not entitled to inherit under Massachusetts
intestate statutes. 58 The Commissioner approved this decision and the wife
then appealed to the federal district court, but the federal judge certified the
question to the state court because an interpretation of state intestacy law
was needed.59
Prior to Woodward, no Massachusetts precedent existed as to posthumous
conception. Entitlement to Social Security benefits was the issue raised in
Stephen, see supra, decided three years after Woodward. But the two cases,
although the facts are similar, reach different results as to whether Social
Security benefits should be available for a child born as a result of
posthumous conception. Woodward looks to the best interest of the child,
the state's objective to provide for an orderly administration of an estate, the
rights of gamete providers, and arrives at a rational judicial decision that
allows for the children to be eligible for intestate inheritance as long as
paternity may be established, parental consent to support the posthumously
conceived child is provided, the procedure and birth are timely, and notice is
provided to all affected. Of course inheritance rights precipitates Social
Security entitlement. In spite of this ruling, the court nonetheless suggests
that the proper forum to resolve this issue in the legislature.6° The essential
difference between the two decisions rested upon the wording of the state's
intestate statutes; attention focused on whether the posthumously conceived
children were "issue" as defined in the statute.
The Massachusetts intestate statute did reference posthumous children,
stating that they "shall be considered as living at the death of their
parent[s].,, 61 But the legislation did not define who was a posthumous child
and, importantly, there is no express requirement that any child be "in
existence" at the death of the decedent from whom the child would inherit.
But it is certainly logical to assume that the statute never contemplated
posthumous conception. Indeed, the posthumously conceived child
provision in the Massachusetts statute had remained essentially unchanged
for 165 years. 62 Therefore, immune from express statutory constraints, the
court set out to establish parameters as to "whether, under our intestacy law,
there is any reason that children conceived after the decedent's death who
are the decedent's direct genetic descendants . . . may not enjoy the same
succession rights as children conceived before the decedent's death who are
the decedent's direct genetic descendants.' 63
58. Id. at 261.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 272. The case will be discussed in greater detail below.
61. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190 § 8 (2004).
62. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264.
63. Id. The court acknowledged that "posthumously conceived children are always
nonmarital children. And because the parentage of such children can be neither
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The parameters established by the court countenance three state interests:
(1) the best interests of the child; (2) the state's interest in the orderl!y
administration of estates; and (3) the reproductive rights of a parent.
Mindful that the state has a long-standing interest in certainty of estate
devolution, the court emphasized an equally strong desire to protect the best
interests of a child. In addition, there is an acknowledgment of the advances
made in medical technology, specifically in reference to assisted
reproductive technology. These advances import responsibilities under
privacy, equal protection, and due process, 65 but they do not decrease the
need for certainty in paternity or maternity.66 When taken together, these
interests also involve practical considerations as to timing: Should there be a
statute of limitations on conception after the death of the decedent? On the
one hand, to do so, "may pose significant burdens on the surviving parent,
and consequently on the child. It requires, in effect, that the survivor make a
decision to bear children while in the freshness of grieving. It also requires
that attempts at conception succeed quickly. 67 But on the other hand, the
certainty and speed of estate administration demands finality so as to meet
the needs of the decedent, existing family members, and support for children
born as a result of posthumous conception. All of these factors must be
balanced in tandem.
The Woodward court held in favor of the mother's petition allowing for
the children to be considered the children of the decedent father under the
facts of posthumous conception. But this was a judicial decision, albeit
well-reasoned, and certainly not the last word on the inheritance and benefits
to which posthumously created children are entitled. In its decision the court
reached the following conclusions. First, that the Massachusetts court could
arrive at a judicial determination because the state had no statute that
expressly prohibited children, born as a result of posthumous conception,
acknowledged nor adjudicated prior to the decedent's death, . . . under the intestacy
statute, posthumously conceived children must obtain a judgment of paternity as a
necessary prerequisite to enjoying inheritance rights in the estate." Id at 267.
64. Id. at 265, 266, 268.
65. See generally Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children are Created Equal: A Proposal
to Address Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234 (2005) (arguing that children posthumously conceived should
be analyzed under a middle level of scrutiny).
66. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269. "The prospective donor parent must clearly and
unequivocally consent not only to posthumous reproduction but also to the support of any
resulting child." Id. Furthermore, "[t]hat a man has medically preserved his [sperm] for
use by his spouse thus may indicate only that he wished to reproduce after some
contingency while he was alive, and not that he consented to the different circumstances
of creating a child after his death." Id.
67. Id. at 268.
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from inheriting under the state's intestate laws. In this vacuum the court
sought to accommodate the "[l]egislature's over-all purposes. ' 68 Second,
the court acknowledged the technological advances made by science and
suggested that "[t]he questions present in this case cry out for lengthy,
careful examination outside the adversary process, which can only address
the specific circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They
demand a comprehensive response reflecting the considered will of the
people. 69  Third, the court reminded all interested parties that a child
conceived posthumously is not automatically the child of the decedent, but
this fact must be resolved in accordance with the state's paternity or
maternity requirements. 70  Similarly, once paternity or maternity is
established, it is incumbent upon the claimants to establish affirmatively that
the decedent consented to the posthumous conception and that the decedent
consented to the support of the resulting child. The court noted that assisted
reproductive technology is not similar to sexual intercourse; indeed, sexual
intercourse is excluded as a means of conception in this context. In the
latter, obligations for support and parental responsibilities can, and have
been, logically presumed and extensive provisions have been made for this
in the Uniform Parentage Act. 71 However, this is not so in the former
instance. With posthumously conceived children, the burden must be upon
the claimant to demonstrate that the parent intended to have a child in order
to assess support obligations. Finally, a fourth factor considered important
by the court was the time in which the child may be conceived and then be
entitled to benefits. The court did not establish an objective standard-a
precise statute of limitations-but suggests a reasonable time is necessary to
balance the grieving, the time necessary for a successful conception, and to
accommodate the orderly administration of the decedent's estate.
72
While decisive, the Woodward case is not the last word on the subject, but
it is a thoughtful response to the issues raised and the Model Act will
address these same issues in the context of a statute. Gillett-Netting, the
federal decision issued in 2004, agreed with Woodward that posthumously
conceived children should be able to take Social Security benefits earned by
the deceased father simply because they were legitimate issue under Arizona
law. 73 Prior to these two cases, however, was In re Estate of Kolacy,74 a
68. Id. at 272.
69. Id.
70. For a discussion of the state's definition of parent, see John L. Gordon,
Successive Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 18 J. Juv. L. 84 (1997).
71. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 203 (2002).
72. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.
73. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004). See supra notes
43-55 and accompanying text discussing Gillett-Netting.
74. 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
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state court decision and one that would again find in favor of children born
of assisted reproductive technology.
The facts in Kolacy were similar to the previous decisions. The husband,
fearful that he would be made sterile by chemotherapy treatments, deposited
sperm with a sperm bank. Almost a year after his death, his widow
underwent an in vitro fertilization procedure and the embryos that resulted
were placed into her womb and she eventually gave birth to twin girls
slightly more than eighteen months after the death of her husband, the sperm
provider.75 The court found that the twins were genetically linked to the
decedent and that the mother was seeking, on behalf of her daughters, to
obtain Social Security benefits for her daughters from her deceased
76husband. Initially, the court was concerned whether the case was an
exclusively federal matter since Social Security is a federal program.
Rejecting this, the court found that this was a case of first impression in the
state and the twins had a right to establish their rights under state law no
matter what occurs at the federal level.77 The court formulated the issue as
to whether the twins, born more than eighteen months after the death of their
father, had a right to inherit from him under the state's intestate statutes.78
The Kolacy court rejected the approach that stated that a person's heirs
should only be determined at the date of the decedent's death: "[T]here have
long been exceptions to the rule that the identity of takers from a decedent's
estate is determined as of the date of death., 79 Furthermore, the court noted
that no statute addressed the issues created by the case. But it then stated: "It
would undoubtedly be useful for the Legislature to deal consciously and in a
well informed way with at least some of the issues presented by reproductive
technology. '80 The court continued, "[w]e judges cannot simply put those
problems on hold in the hope that some day (which may never come) the
Legislature will deal with the problem in question." 81 Thus, the court
discerned a general legislative intent to enable children to take property from
their parents and that once a genetic connection is established, we should
"routinely grant that child the legal status of being an heir of the decedent." 82
An exception, the court notes, would occur when there are "serious problems
75. Id. at 1258.
76. Id. at 1259-60.
77. Id. at 1260.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261. The court suggested that the legislature should
impose a time limit on the ability of after born children to take from or through a parent.
Id. at 1262.
81. Id. at 1261.
82. Id. at 1262.
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in terms of the orderly administration of estates. ' 8 3 But in spite of practical
issues yet to be resolved, the court held that the twins were entitled to inherit
under New Jersey's intestate statutes. The rationale provided was that "a
fundamental policy of the law should be to enhance and enlarge the rights of
each human being to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the duty
not to intrude unfairly upon the interests of other persons."
84
Soon after this decision, another state court decision, held in a permissive
fashion such as Gillett-Netting, Woodward, and Kolacy, that a posthumously
conceived child may inherit. This decision was In re Martin.
85
Interestingly, the facts of Martin were different from those of previous
decisions. Specifically, in Martin the issue was whether, "the terms 'issue'
and 'descendants' include children conceived by means of in vitro
fertilization with the cryopreserved semen of the Grantor's son who had died
several years prior to such conception." 86 Thus, unlike the previous federal
and state decisions, the court was asked to incorporate posthumous
conception into the terms of a trust instrument, address a conception that
occurred several years after the death of the gamete provider, and benefit not
children, but issue of the Grantor, the creator of the trust. The decision is
significant because it has immense implications for class gift designations
under trusts.
The facts of Martin were as follows: Two children were born as a result of
posthumous conception; James Mitchell was born three years after the death
of his father and Warren was born five years after the death of his father.
There was no dispute as to the genetic connection. Their father was the son
of a man-the Grantor-who had created a trust whereby his trustees had
discretion to "sprinkle" principal to the issue or descendants of the Grantor,
and then the Grantor's wife had the ability to give whatever remains of the
trust principal at her death to the Grantor's issue or descendants. Thus, the
Grantor had created a familiar trust device whereby he wanted to benefit his
dynasty, persons he defines as issue and descendants. The practical
consideration for the court was whether "the two infant boys are
'descendants' and 'issue' for purposes of such provisions."
87
Similar to other cases, no state statute addressed the facts presented in the
case. Admittedly, there were statutes that made reference to "posthumous
children" but they were enacted long before the advances in medical
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1263. For support of this position, see generally Laurence C. Nolan,
Critiquing Society's Response to the Needs of Posthumously Conceived Children, 82 OR.
L. REv. 1067 (2003); Jason Pobjoy, Medically Mediated Reproduction: Posthumous
Conception and the Best Interests of the Child, 15 J.L. & MED. 450 (2007).
85. 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007).
86. Id. at 208.
87. Id.
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technology that generate this issue. Those earlier statutes concerned
children who were in gestation at the time of death of the decedent or other
88
vesting event. Nonetheless, the court noted that a few states had enacted
statutes that addressed the issue of posthumous conception, 89 and the court
discussed the few cases that addressed the issue presented to date,
specifically, Woodward, Kolacy, and Gillett-Netting, all discussed supra, all
of which allowed the child to qualify for benefits.
The court based its opinion upon the intent of the parties involved. First,
the court could find no intent evidenced by the Grantor that children
conceived by assisted reproductive technology be excluded from being part
of the dynasty of beneficiaries intended by the Grantor. In addressing the
status of beneficiaries under the terms of a trust, the intent of the Grantor is
paramount. Second, the court held that the provider of the sperm, the
deceased parent of the two boys, intended the boys to be his own and to
benefit from him. Thus, in allowing the boys to be considered "issue" or
"descendants" under the terms of the trust, the court held that, "if an
individual considers a child to be his or her own, society through its laws
should do so as well." 90
Interestingly, the court in Martin did not address the length of time
between the date of death of the provider of the sperm and the posthumous
conception of the two boys. A fleeting reference was made to the
cryopreserved sperm of the provider having been destroyed, eliminating the
possibility of any additional issue or descendents. And the court noted that
the Louisiana Code provides that a post-conceived child may inherit from
his or her father if the child is born within three years of the father's death.9'
The time allowance by the court may be in accordance with traditional class
gift construction, which provides that when there has been no distribution of
the trust corpus to the descendants to date, it is administratively convenient
to include these two after-born issue within the class of persons eligible to
take under the Grantor's trust.92 Finally, obeisant to the legislature, the court
repeated a familiar plea: "[T]here is a need for comprehensive legislation to
resolve the issues raised by advances in biotechnology."
93
With the exception of the federal Stephen decision in 2005, there were, by
the time of Martin, three well-reasoned decisions offering a rationale for
either providing benefits for posthumously conceived children or including
them as issue or descendants. Nonetheless, in 2007 and then in 2008,
88. Id. at 210.
89. These statutes and others will be discussed, infra Part III.
90. In re Martin, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
91. See id. at 210 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2008)).
92. For an explanation of class gift distribution generally, see RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN
& MICHAEL T. FLANNERY, DECEDENTS' ESTATES 629-48 (2006).
93. In re Martin, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
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different state courts denied posthumously conceived children the right to
take under state intestate statutes. This seemingly reversed the trend and
therefore each case must be analyzed as to why.
The first decision, Khabbaz v. Commissioner of Social Security,94 ruled
that a child conceived after her father's death via artificial insemination was
ineligible to inherit from her father's estate under the state's intestate
statutes. 95 The facts were similar to other cases previously decided. Man
and woman were married and already had one child when the man was
diagnosed with a terminal illness. He and his wife then elected to
cryopreserve sperm so that she could become artificially inseminated in the
event he died. The man did die and two years after the man's death a child
was born, Christine, and her mother applied for Social Security benefits in
accordance with federal law. That law provides that in order to qualify, a
child must be able to inherit as an intestate heir of the decedent parent under
the state's intestate statute: 96 "Thus, if Christine may inherit from [her
father] as his surviving issue under New Hampshire intestacy law, she is
considered to be the 'child' of [her father] under the [Social Security Act]
and is therefore entitled to a child's insurance benefits."97  The
Commissioner of Social Security denied Christine's claim for benefits,
citing to her status under the state's intestacy statute and Christine appealed
the decision to the state courts.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that the state statute's use of
the term "surviving" issue incorporates a requirement that the issue be
"alive" or "in existence" at the time of the death of the person from whom
the child would inherit.98 Christine was not alive until more than a year after
her father's death and therefore did not come within the ambit of the statute.
Furthermore, since no "posthumously conceived" child can be "in existence"
at the date of death of someone from whom he or she would take, it is
impossible under the statute for such a child to be an intestate heir.
94. 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007). See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Khabbaz v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007) (No. 2006-0751), 2007 WL 4967426
(stressing that it is illogical to recognize a biological connection but deny a concomitant
legal one); Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Khabbaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d
1180 (N.H. 2007) (No. 2006-0751), 206 WL 5431537 (arguing for strict time constraints
to be imposed). See also Child Conceived After Father's Death via Banked Sperm isn't
"Surviving Issue," 33 BNA FAM. L. REP. 1462 (2007); Deceased Beneficiary's
Posthumous Children-In Vitro Fertilization, 33 BNA FAM. L. REP. 1441 (2007).
95. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182.
96. Id. For a discussion of intestate succession and the laws that may affect
posthumously conceived children, see 23 AM. JUR. 2D Descent and Distribution § 108
(2002).
97. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182.
98. Id. at 1184.
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Concluding that the statute must be read as a whole, rather than taken in
isolation, there is "clear legislative intent to create an overall statutory
scheme under which those who 'survive' a decedent-that is, those who
remain alive at the time of the decedent's death-may inherit in a timely and
orderly fashion contingent upon who is alive."99  To hold otherwise,
according to the court, would undermine the orderly distribution process
clearly contemplated by the state.
Khabbaz rejected the reasoning of Woodward, holding that the
Massachusetts decision in Woodward was based upon intestate statutes
different from those in New Hampshire. Furthermore, to adopt Woodward's
reasonable approach so as to protect a class of persons conceived
posthumously, would have required the court to add words to the statute and
the court was not willing to do so. 00 But like Woodward and all of the other
decisions, the New Hampshire court called upon the state legislature to
develop a legislative response to the new medical technology reflective of
the considered will of the people.101
The second decision, Finley v. Astrue, 10 2 also denied a posthumously
conceived child the right to inherit under the state's intestate statutes. As in
the Khabbaz decision, the man and woman were married and the man
cryopreserved sperm at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences for
the purpose of in vitro fertilization. The man died intestate on July 19, 2001,
and eleven months later his widow had "two of the previously frozen
embryos thawed and transferred into her uterus, resulting in a single
pregnancy." ' 10 A child was born on March 4, 2003, and the mother filed a
claim for Social Security benefits the following month. Initially, the
administrative law judge awarded the child the requested benefits, but the
Appeals Council reversed this decision and the mother then appealed to the
courts.
In rejecting the mother's appeal, the court looked to the language of the
statute, which stipulated that posthumous descendants of the intestate must
be conceived before the decedent's death.10 4 Since the word "conceived" is
not defined in the statute and an argument could be made that conception
occurred when the embryo was created during the life of the father, the court
could have interpreted the statute to allow for inclusion within the terms of
the statute. But the court rejected this definition of "conceived" and held
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1186.
101. Id. (citing Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002)).
102. 270 S.W.3d 849 (Ark. 2008); see also Wills & Estates-Assisted Conception-
IVF-Implantation after Father's Death- "Surviving Child, " 34 BNA FAM. L. REP. 1119
(2008).
103. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850-51.
104. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (2004).
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that since the statute was enacted long before in vitro fertilization was
possible, the legislature did not intend to define conception in the context of
a petri dish. The court commented: "[W]e are very hesitant to interpret a
legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear
that a drafting error or omission has circumvented the legislative intent."
10 5
Furthermore, "[o]ur role is not to create the law, but to interpret the law and
to give effect to the legislature's intent."
' 0 6
The court referred to previous decisions affecting the rights of
posthumously conceived issue-Khabbaz, Stephen, Gillett-Netting, and
Woodward-but concluded that none of these cases could impact the clear
and unique language of the Arkansas code. But, as in all of the other cases,
the court stated: "[W]e strongly encourage the General Assembly to revisit
the intestacy succession statutes to address the issues involved in the instant
case and those that have not but will likely evolve."'
10 7
The judicial solicitation of legislative guidelines is the consistent element
in all of the existent cases involving posthumous conception in the evolution
of medical technological advances in assisted reproductive technology.
What follows is a review of existing statutes-a few obviously in response
to the issues raised in the preceding cases. Finally, we will conclude with an
analysis of the American Bar Association recommended Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology.
10 8
III. STATUTORY RESPONSES TO POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Consistent within all of the cases discussed, is the request for legislative
guidance in the conferral of inheritance and benefits rights for posthumously
created children. Gradually there has been increasing statutory attention
given to this phenomenon. 109  Nonetheless, the issue of posthumous
105. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853.
106. Id. at 854.
107. Id. at 855.
108. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008).
109. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002) (allowing for a posthumously
conceived child to be considered a child of the decedent-provider if the decedent
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
provider would be a parent of the child); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-106(8)(2008) ("If a
spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of
the child."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (Supp. 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
160.707 (Vernon 2008) ("If a spouse dies before the placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased
spouse consented in a record kept by a licensed physician that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child."); WASH.
The Momentum of Posthumous Conception
conception, specifically in the context of conception after the death of the
decedent, is a recent phenomenon and the legislatures have not considered
all of the permeations-the implication for trusts and the Rule Against
Perpetuities for example.' 10 Even in the few statutes that can be interpreted
as being applicable, upon review of the legislative intent at the enactment,
there will be scant consideration, if any at all, as to posthumous conception.
There are few international statutes"' from which guidance may be drawn,
and only a scattering of articles and surveys." 2 Of recent import is the
REV. CODE § 26.26.730 (2005) ("If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an
embryo, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased
spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the
deceased spouse would be a parent of the child."); and significantly, the UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-120(k) (2006) (permitting a child to be treated as in gestation at the death of the
gamete provider if the child is in utero not later than 36 months after the provider's death,
or born not later than 45 months after the provider's death. Being "in gestation" will
result in all rights associated with inheritance.) California and Louisiana have also
enacted statutes permitting a posthumously conceived child to be treated as "in being."
See, CAL. FAM. CODE § 7648.9 (West Supp. 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A)
(2008).
110. For a discussion of estate planning issues raised by posthumous conception, see
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the Inconceivable: Legal Recognition of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 34 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 154 (2008).
111. See, e.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 12, sched. 3
(Eng.) (while the statute does not discuss the particular circumstances of posthumous
conception, it does discuss consent requirements for a provider's gametes during life and
after death); Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act, 2003, c. 24, §
1, (Eng.) (the statute does incorporate a reference to posthumous conception by inclusion
of circumstances when provider may become the legal parent of a posthumously
conceived child).
112. See, e.g., Elizabeth Corrigan, S. Elizabeth Mumford & M.G.R. Hull, Posthumous
Storage and Use of Sperm and Embryos: Survey of Opinion of Treatment Centres, 313
BRIT. MED. J. 24 (1996) (discussing the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of
1990, allowing staff to abstain from participating in posthumous conceptions on
conscientious grounds); Clare Dyer, Government Reviews Law on "Posthumous
Conceptions," 315 BRIT. MED. J. 831 (1997) (discussing British government's
completion of the first stage of its review of posthumous conceptions laws); Jose Miola,
Mix-Ups, Mistake and Moral Judgment: Recent Developments in U.K. Law on Assisted
Conception, 12 FEMINIST LEGAL STuD. 67 (2004) (providing an analysis of current British
law); F. Shenfield, Filiation in Assisted Reproduction: Potential Cotficts and Legal
Implications, 9 HUM. REPROD. 1348 (1994) (comparing British and French laws on
posthumous conception); Kirsty Horsey, Regulating Posthumous Conception, IVF NEWS,
Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.ivf.net/ivf/regulatingposthumous conception-
023 1-en.html (describing recent decisions in Israel, Belgium and Japan on posthumous
conception).
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model legislation adopted by the American Bar Association in the winter of
2008, to be discussed separately in this Article. But first, it is useful to
review a compilation of what exists now at the federal and state levels.
These statutes and the cases previously discussed, prompt an examination of
the model legislation approved by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association.
A. FEDERAL STA TUTES AND REG ULA TIONS
To date, the majority of the cases that have arisen in the context of
posthumous conception concerned the child's attempts to qualify for Social
Security benefits as a result of a parent's death. The United States Code
provides the basis for these rulings, with the code defining the word "child"
for inclusion in the benefits program. 1 3 Because the federal Social Security
benefits are dependent upon state laws concerning paternity and the ability
to inherit intestate, federal specifics as to posthumous conception are sparse.
In accordance, federal regulations do stipulate that a "natural child" is
eligible for benefits if state law allows inheritance under intestacy. 114 But
there are no specific comments concerning posthumous conception.
While the focus of the existent cases has been upon federal benefits, state
benefits would also be impacted by requirements for eligibility. As may
have been expected, state regulatory provisions do not expressly116
contemplate posthumously conceived children. This is not to say that the
113. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(l), 402(d)(3), 416(h)(2)(A) (2000).
114. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2008).
115. See, e.g., Old-Age, Disability, Dependents' and Survivors' Insurance Benefits;
Period of Disability, 44 Fed. Reg. 34,481 (June 15, 1979); Federal Old-Age, Disability,
Dependents' and Survivors' Insurance Benefits, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,936 (proposed Nov. 14,
1978) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404). For a discussion of state and federal statutes
and court decisions affecting the legal rights of posthumously conceived children, see
William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Legal Status of Posthumously Conceived Child of
Decedent, 17 A.L.R. 6th 593 (2006).
116. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 582 (2008) (codifying that children are
eligible for state public retirement benefits if living at death of employed parent or who
were conceived prior to his or her death); 8 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1502-1 (2007)
(codifying that children are eligible who are biological children of a member and are
conceived prior to date of the member's death and are born within normal gestational
periods after death of the member parent); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 103 (2003)
(codifying that, for crime victim reparations, a child must be conceived prior to but born
after the personal injury or death of the victim); S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:16:16:01 (2002)
(codifying that cement commission retirement benefits includes child or children as those
conceived during the employee's lifetime and born after the employee's death); 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 75. 1(b) (2008) (regarding hazardous profession death benefits: "No claim
for benefits on behalf of a child born after the death of the law enforcement officer or fire
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courts would not be free to fashion a remedy as was done for federal
eligibility in cases such as Woodward, but explicit entitlement is absent and
presumptively must be addressed by state legislatures.
It is reasonable that eventually federal courts will entertain petitions from
claimants based upon the grounds enumerated in many previous cases that
discussed the equal protection and due process rights of posthumously
conceived children. The arguments may result from a claim that conception
occurs as soon as an embryo is formed, and if that conception takes place
during the lifetime of the gamete provider it is not rational to deny the
resulting child the status of issue or descendant or child. Likewise, it is
irrational to deny benefits to a child conceived posthumously if the provider
of the gamete consented to the reproduction and intended that the resulting
child be his or her own. There are state considerations of certainty and
timing as rational reasons for denial. But barring these, the federal claims
are nascent and expected. Passage of a federal statute that incorporates the
suggestions made in this Article would preempt these challenges.
B. STATE STATUTES
A few states have recently enacted legislation that specifically addresses
the issues raised by posthumous conception. Interestingly, at present, none
of these states is one that was impacted by the decisions discussed
previously. Those states that have made judicial determinations are
Arkansas (denying status), New Hampshire (denying status), New York
(permitting status), Massachusetts (permitting status), and New Jersey
(permitting status). But the fact that states have begun to enact legislation,
plus initiatives associated with the Model Act, indicates a movement
towards recognition.
California now provides that:
[flor purposes of determining rights to property to be distributed upon
the death of a decedent, a child of the decedent conceived after the
death of the decedent, other than a child conceived as a result of
human cloning, shall be deemed to have been born in the lifetime of
the decedent if the child or his or her representative proves by clear
and convincing evidence that specified conditions are satisfied.
fighter will be paid, unless it is accompanied by a certificate of the attending physician
that the child was conceived during the decedent's lifetime.").
117. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. 775 (West). This statute amends CAL. FAM. CODE §§
7611, 7630, and 7650; adds Chapter 4.4 to Division 2 of the CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE; amends CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10172 and 10172.5; amends CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453;
and adds CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5, 249.6, 249.7, and 249.8. All of the legislative
history associated with the passage of the bill may be found at:
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A review of the discussion offered concerning the new California legislation
reveals a number of questions still unanswered. For example, when a
posthumously conceived child is born, should the child have the right to
recover from previous distributees? That is, if the estate was distributed and
then an additional child was born and that child would qualify as taking from
the estate, how should that posthumously conceived child take from the
existing heirs?' 18 Such considerations are not insurmountable obstacles,
such issues having been considered and disposed of through probate statutes
already in existence. The legislature in Louisiana was among the first to
enact a statute permitting posthumous children to inherit from parents who
anticipated this possibility and then specifically consented to this eventual
occurrence, thus legitimating the child for purposes of inheritance. Under
the current version of the state statute, the child must be born within three
years of the death of the decedent, and once born, the child is entitled to "all
rights, including the capacity to inherit from the decedent as the child would
have had the child been in existence at the time of the death of the deceased
parent."119
Consent of the provider of the gamete to posthumous conception is an
essential element of any new legislation being considered. Illustrative is the
Virginia provision requiring that before a provider may be considered a
parent of a posthumously conceived child, that same decedent, prior to
death, must have consented in writing to the implantation of the procedure
resulting in birth. 12 Likewise, Texas provides that,
[i]f a spouse dies before the placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos,
the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record kept by a licensed physician
that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death the deceased
spouse would be a parent of the child.121
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0651-0700/ab_695_bill_20040105
amended _asm.pdf.
118. See CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., Decedents' Estates: Posthumously Conceived
Children, A.B. 1910 - Bill Analysis, Reg. Sess. 2003-2004 (June 22, 2004).
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2008).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2008). For further information, see J. SUBCOMM. ON
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 10
(1991).
121. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Supp. 2008). For further information, see
OFFICE OF H. B. ANALYSIS, BILL ANALYSIS OF H.B. 920, H. 77 (2001).
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Similar provisions may be found in North Dakota,' 22 Louisiana, 123 and
Washington. 124 Florida, on the other hand, provides that a posthumously
conceived child is not entitled to inherit under state intestacy statutes unless
the decedent provided for that child in his or her last will and testament.1
25
The issue of consent recently arose in California. The case, Estate ofg. , 126
Kievernagel, involved a widow's right to use the cryopreserved sperm of
her husband after he died suddenly in a helicopter crash in 2005. When the
husband deposited his sperm with the clinic he signed an agreement that
stated that the sperm was his sole and separate property and that he retained
all control over its disposition. In addition, the husband had checked the box
on the agreement that stated that he wanted the sperm destroyed upon his
death. The court differentiated the sperm from an embryo in which the wife
would have a consideration. Only the husband had an interest in his sperm
and when he did not give his consent to its use following his death, the
widow could not use it for posthumous conception purposes. The sperm was
then destroyed.
27
C. UNIFORMACTS
1. Uniform Probate Code
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
proposed the Uniform Probate Code 128 "to simplify and clarify the law
concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons,
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (Supp. 2007) (codifying that a decedent is a
"parent" of a posthumously conceived child only if decedent consented in the record to
assisted reproduction after death).
123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2008) (codifying that a posthumously
conceived child is entitled to all rights of inheritance provided that the decedent
specifically consented to posthumous conception in writing and so long as conception
occurs within three years of death).
124. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2005) ("If a spouse dies before
placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child.")
125. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2005).
126. In re Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
127. Id. at 312-18.
128. For complete text, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE (2006), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upc/final2005.pdf.
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minors and incapacitated persons."'' 29 But even as the law seeks to protect
the interests of persons, its corollary is "to promote a speedy and efficient
system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to
his successors."'' 30 To accomplish both its protective role and its efficiency
stance, the Code provides for those states that adopt it, an orderly approach
to passing the property of a decedent who (1) dies without a last will and
testament (intestate succession), (2) dies with a last will and testament
naming persons as heirs or legatees (testate succession), or (3) creates trusts
during life that name beneficiaries that must be determined at a point in
time. Because posthumous conception can create persons who would
qualify under intestate, testate or trust law, the Uniform Probate Code would
be impacted by the resolution of posthumous conception.
The provision defining a child defines this status as someone who takes
under intestate succession, "from the parent whose relationship is involved
and excludes a person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or
any more remote descendant."' 13 1 Any court seeking to establish rights for a
posthumously created child would be referred to the intestate statutes and to
the requirements for establishing paternity. 132 In addition, little clarity is
provided by the Restatement (Third) of Property. The applicable provision
in the Restatement simply states that a child must be born within a
reasonable time after the decedent's death under circumstances that indicate
that the decedent approved of that child's right to inherit under the state's
129. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(1). For a discussion of the Uniform Probate
Code and the new reproductive technology, see Christine Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle
in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of
New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335 (1994); Ronald Chester,
Posthumously Conceived Heirs Under a Revised Uniform Probate Code, 38 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 727 (2004).
130. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § I-102(b)(3).
131. Id. § 1-201(5).
132. Id § 2-114 ("Parent and Child Relationship.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), for purposes of intestate
succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of his [or
her] natural parents regardless of their marital status. The parent and child
relationship may be established under the [Uniform Parentage Act] [applicable
state law] [insert proper statutory reference].
(b) An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parent or parents
and not of his [or her] natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse of
either natural parent has no effect on (i) the relationship between the child and
that natural parent or (ii) the right of the child or a descendant of the child to
inherit from or through the other natural parent.
(c) Inheritance from or through a child by either natural parent or his [or her]
kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the child as his
[or hers], and has not refused to support the child.").
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applicable statutes.1 33 Arguments may be made, but there is nothing specific
to posthumous conception.
During the summer of 2008, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws amended the Uniform Probate Code to, among other
changes, make provision for posthumously conceived children. This
recognition of intestacy status for the posthumously conceived child is a
significant development, especially as it will influence state legislatures in
adopting similar statutes. Under the new Uniform Probate Code provision,
"an individual is a parent of a child of assisted reproduction who is
conceived after the individual's death, [and] the child is treated as in
gestation at the individual's death for purposes of ... [intestate succession]
... if the child is: (1) in utero not later than 36 months after the individual's
death; or (2) born not later than 45 months after the individual's death."' 134
Comments concerning the new provision recognize the increase in assisted
reproductive technology, as well as the ethical policies of the American
Medical Association mandating that stored sperm not be used for purposes
other than intended by the donor. 1
35
Once the Commissioners adopted the policy allowing for the
posthumously conceived child to be considered as in gestation, attendant
policies followed. Thus, first, the decedent's personal representative, in
administering the estate of the decedent, may accommodate the possibility of
posthumous conception in the distribution of the estate. 136 Second, the
thirty-six month period was not chosen without reference to other code
policies. Under Section 3-1006, an heir is allowed to recover property
improperly distributed, or its value, from any distributees during the later of
three years after the decedent's death or one year after distribution. The
forty-five month period is based on the thirty-six months plus an additional
nine months added to allow for a period of pregnancy. Third, if any
posthumously conceived child is a member of a class gift, then the child is
included among those living at the distribution date of the gift if the "child
lives 120 hours after birth and was in utero not later than 36 months after the
deceased parent's death or bom not later than 45 months after the deceased
parent's death. 137
Assuming that the intent of the donor is satisfied under the provisions
mandated by the American Medical Association, the provisions of the
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5
cmt. 1(1999).
134. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (2008 amend.), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upc/2008amapproved.pdf.
135. AM. MED. Ass'N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS E-2.04 (Issued June 1993; updated December 2004).
136. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703 (2006).
137. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(g)(2) (2008 amend.).
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Uniform Probate Code satisfy the requirements of the judicial decisions that
have been perplexed by the difficulties proposed by posthumous conception.
Under these statutory rules, a reasonable time is established, consent
obtained, and paternity established. We will discuss paternity in connection
with the next uniform act, the Uniform Parentage Act.
2. Uniform Parentage Act
In addition to the Uniform Probate Code, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the most recent version
of the Uniform Parentage Act in 2000, and then amended it in 2002.138 The
more recent version of the Act incorporates under Article 7, the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (1988),139 and "applies its
provisions to nonmarital as well as marital children born as a result of
assisted reproductive technologies. ' ' 40 In addition to this Act, the Uniform
Parentage Act seeks to provide consistency in application with the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (2001) and the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997). Obviously, the governing
consideration is the best interest of any child in terms of support and
custody, and paternity is a major hurdle in both of these pursuits.
Adopted in 2008, the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology makes specific reference to the Uniform Parentage Act:
"Articles 6 and 7 of the [Model Act] are drawn from and are identical to the
provisions of the [UPA] dealing with children of assisted reproduction and
gestational agreements."' 14 1 When the Uniform Parentage Act was amended
in 2002, it allowed for the possibility of a posthumous child to be considered
a child of the decedent parent if "the deceased spouse consented in a record
that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
individual would be a parent of the child. 142  This is a significant
improvement over the much more restrictive approach of the Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act of 1988. In this latter statute, "an
individual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is
conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg
138. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf.
139. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.pdf. The Act provides that
"[a]n individual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is
conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg or sperm, is
not a parent of the resulting child." Id. § 4(b).
140. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note.
141. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., REPORT at 38 (2008).
142. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.
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or sperm is not a parent of the resulting child."' 143 Nonetheless, comments to
the statute's provision indicate that an argument could be made that the
provision recognizes the possibility that a posthumously conceived child
could still inherit if the decedent provider so provided in a valid last will and
testament.
1 4
The Uniform Parentage Act certainly contemplates all of the means of
assisted reproduction. 145 Nonetheless, the parent-child relationship does not
exist unless, in the general context of posthumous conception, the man
"consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under [Article] 7 which
resulted in the birth of the child . . . or [in] an adjudication confirming the
man as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the agreement was
validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable under other law .... 146 This
paternity procedure, involving consent to be a parent, is distinctive from the
presumption of paternity for a child in gestation-in existence-at the death
of the father and born within three hundred days after the marriage between
the mother and father was "terminated by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce." 147 Nor is this consent procedure the same as "[i]f a
married couple uses their own eggs and sperm to conceive a child born to
the wife . . . . The wife is the mother-by gestation and genetics, the
husband is the father-by genetics and presumption."
' 148
Parental status attained by a person who died prior to conception is treated
under the Uniform Parentage Act, as previously described, as derived
generally from the consent of the gamete provider. Thus the Act provides:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent
of the child.'
49
143. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(b).
144. Id. And this approach has been adopted in Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4)
(West 2005).
145. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (2002) ("'Assisted reproduction' means a
method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse. The term includes: (A)
intrauterine insemination; (B) donation of eggs; (C) donation of embryos; (D) in-vitro
fertilization and transfer of embryos; and (E) intracytoplasmic sperm injection.").
146. Id. § 201(b)(5)-(6).
147. Id. § 204.
148. Id. art. 7 cmt.
149. Id. § 707. Likewise, "[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction by a woman as provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of
her child, is a parent of the resulting child." Id. § 703. And "the husband of a wife who
gives birth to a child by means of assisted reproduction may not challenge his paternity..
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By implication, posthumous conception will result in the child born being
the child of the decedent if the decedent consented in a manner deemed
permissible. Such a procedure would meet the minimum requirements of
the cases previously discussed.
The consent requirement is not coupled with a "reasonable time"
limitation as with the Restatement (Third) of Property, Wills and Other
Donative Transfers, but the elements of a sufficient consent by the gamete
provider will be an essential element of the Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology. 150 It is not surprising that the Model Act uses the
same language as the Uniform Parentage Act, stressing the necessity of
obtaining consent of the gamete provider. Certainly disputes will arise as to
whether the consent may be implied or written, and how to address the status
of an embryo, which involves the gametes of two providers. These issues are
addressed in the Model Act.
IV. THE MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
The Model Act151 was formulated and adopted in an effort to encourage
uniformity among the states as they seek to integrate assisted reproductive
technology into state laws and procedures. Certainly the provisions seek to
address the few cases that have been decided to date, and discussed
previously. The Model Act, as well as those cases, represent the conflict
among first, the emerging rights of adults seeking to procreate, second, the
states' responsibilities toward the best interests of the resulting children, and
third, the need for certainty in the distribution of inheritance and benefits.
152
• unless: ... (2) the court finds that he did not consent to the assisted reproduction, before
or after birth of the child." Id. § 705(a).
150. See id. § 304 (listing the meager rules concerning acknowledgment of paternity).
151. For a complete text of the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology (2008), see http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf The
Model Act, as distinguished from a uniform act, was drafted by the Committee on
Reproductive and Genetic Technology of the Section of Family Law of the American Bar
Association. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., at prefatory note (2008).
It was approved by the American Bar Association in 2008. Id. See generally, Kindregan
& Snyder, supra note 16 (describing how the Act began in 1988 in the midst of "Baby
M" headlines, and was adopted, twenty years later, at a time when collaborative
reproduction is increasingly common).
152. There has been little consideration given to additional legal issues that will occur
as a result of assisted reproductive technology. See, e.g., Michael K. Elliott, Tales of
Parenthood from the Crypt: The Predicament of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 39
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47 (2004); Joshua Greenfield, Dad Was Born a Thousand
Years Ago? An Examination of Post-Mortem Conception and Inheritance, with a Focus
on the Rule Against Perpetuities, 8 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 277 (2007); Hoffman &
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The issues generated are novel ones and are hardly compatible with statutes
or common law precedents, although as the abovementioned cases
demonstrate, attempts have been made to accommodate the new technology.
The Model Act signals the suddenness of these issues when it writes, in
the Prefatory Note to the Model Act:
Since the birth of the first in vitro fertilization (IVF) baby in 1978,
extraordinary advances in reproductive medicine have made
biological parenthood possible for people with infertility, certain other
medical conditions, for persons who risk passing on inheritable
diseases or genetic abnormalities, or for persons who are effectively
infertile due to social rather than medical reasons.153
And signaling that future developments will occur, the Model Act will be
supplemented at later dates with "a statement of necessary provisions and
standards of best practice for drafting the informed consents and various
[assisted reproductive technology] agreements suggested or required by [the
Act].' 54 Notably the Model Act,
goes beyond purely parentage issues and proposes standards
protecting the legal interests of all concerned parties as these
technologies are increasingly used to conceive children. It neither
advocates nor opposes the use of these technologies, but accepts the
reality that many people are using them today and proposes legal
solutions and protections for those involved.
155
Each of the judicial controversies that has arisen in connection with
posthumous conception occasioned the court to call for legislative guidance
in this developing area of the law. The Model Act is an attempt to provide
Morriss, supra note 10. Sociological issues have not been fully explored. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Collins, Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in
Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 431 (2005) (arguing for a
presumption in favor of consent when the decedent dies suddenly); Gary S. Nakhuda,
Joseph E. Pena, & Mark V. Sauer, Deaths of HIV-Positive Men in the Context of Assisted
Reproduction: Five Case Studies from a Single Center, 19 AIDS PATIENT CARE & STDs
712 (2005) (discussing HIV infection); Bob Simpson, Making 'Bad' Deaths 'Good': The
Kinship Consequences of Posthumous Conception, 7 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST.
1 (2001) (arguing that the commercialization of sperm may detract from the realization
that the resulting child is human).
153. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., at prefatory note (2008).
154. Id.
155. Kindregan & Snyder, supra note 16, at 207. The reality of practice precipitates
caution in others, especially those opposed to "[t]hese developments [in medical science
that are] ... negative and cannot be utilized when they involve the destruction of human
beings or when they employ means which contradict the dignity of the person or when
they are used for purposes contrary to the integral good of man." INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS
PERSONAE, supra note 13, at 3.
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this guidance: "The growing number of court decisions and fast-paced
medical developments such as cryopreservation of gametes and embryos, in
vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection
make it abundantly clear that some legislation on assisted reproduction is
needed." 156 But the Model Act is not to be the final word, and was not
considered to be so by the drafters. Instead,
[t]he Act should stimulate awareness and analysis within the
framework of its various proposals. Legislative committees could use
the issues generated by the Act to seek the input of diverse groups of
professionals, including legal scholars, practicing attorneys, medical
practitioners, scientists and ethicists to review these proposals and to
seek alternative proposals.
157
The Model Act interfaces with the posthumous-conception-judicial-
decisions discussed previously and offers legislative guidance as requested.
When analyzed, these decisions suggest that guidance is needed in the
following areas: (1) the establishment of paternity or maternity between the
gamete provider and the resulting child; (2) consent to paternity or maternity
by the gamete provider for the resulting child; (3) accommodation within the
existing state structure for state inheritance and any state benefits; (4)
accommodation within the existing federal status requirements for the
conferral of federal benefits; and (5) a resolution of paternity or maternity
within a reasonable time so as to accommodate an orderly and certain
distribution of inheritance and benefits. To this list, we will also suggest that
there be a sixth area: (6) ethical and religious accommodations associated
with posthumous conception. We now examine each of these within the
specific parameters of the Model Act.
1. Establishing Paternity or Maternity
The Model Act takes "advantage of the prior work done on parentage by
incorporating the Uniform Parentage Act standards, where they can now be
viewed in the broader context of existing and emerging reproductive
156. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., at Report to the House of
Delegates (2008).
157. Id. See, e.g., Miller v. American Infertility Group of Illinois, 897 N.E.2d 837
(I1l. App. Ct. 2008) (involving a couple that underwent attempted in vitro fertilization
(IVF) at the defendant clinic, and the clinic did not cryopreserve the resulting blastocyst
(early form of embryo) for future use. The couple then sought damages from the clinic
under the state's Wrongful Death Act for the destruction of the embryo. The court ruled
that the Act must be strictly construed and it has never been applied to situations
involving in vitro fertilization and the cryopreservation of blastocysts or pre-embryos.
Such a cause of action could only come about through legislative action, not judicial
pronouncement.).
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technologies." 158 Specifically, the Model Act's Articles 6 and 7 are identical
to the provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act, since "the UPA has
previously been approved by the American Bar Association [and] these
articles [in the Model Act] clearly reflect existing ABA policy.'
159
Nonetheless, the Model Act excludes from its provisions "the birth of a child
conceived by means of sexual intercourse," or when a bona fide donor is
involved in the subsequent birth of a child. 161 Uniquely, the Model Act
specifically includes-and is intended to concern-those situations when "[a]
man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a
woman ... with the intent to be the parent of her child ....,,162 And then, in
reference to posthumous conception, "to produce a live birth after a gamete
provider has died." 163 The Model Act applies to more than posthumous
conception. It encompasses the many new medical procedures by which
persons seek to become parents: "The Act provides a framework by which
158. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., at Report to the House of
Delegates (2008). The Uniform Probate Code revisions pertaining to posthumous
conception were not approved until summer of 2008, and the Model Act did not wish to
contradict this or the 2002 revisions of the Uniform Parentage Act, hence the Model Act
cautions legislatures to make certain that no conflict exists among the various statutes
that they may have enacted. Kindregan & Snyder, supra note 16, at 219.
159. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., at Report to the House of
Delegates (2008).
160. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 601 (2008). Obviously,
most contests over paternity are generated in the context of sexual intercourse and a
dispute concerning the resulting child. See, e.g., Pettit v. Pettit, 189 P.3d 1102 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that a man's admission that he was the father of a child in a divorce
petition precluded him from later denying paternity); Burden v. Burden, 945 A.2d 656
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (holding that a man who signed a voluntary acknowledgment
of paternity in another state, as to a child born to his wife before they even met, is
required to pay child support for the child when the man and the wife divorced six years
later); In re J.B., 953 A.2d 1186 (N.H. 2008) (holding that a man, later proven not to be
the biological parent, was nonetheless the father of a nonmarital child when he had
established sufficient facts to establish himself as a parent).
161. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 602; see also id. § 102(10)
("'Donor' means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted
reproduction, whether or not for consideration. The term does not include: (a) a husband
who provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, to be used for assisted reproduction by
the wife; (b) a woman who gives birth to a child by means of assisted reproduction except
as otherwise provided in Article 6; or (c) a parent under Article 6 or an intended parent
under Article 7. Embryo donor means a person or persons with dispositional control of
an embryo who provides it to another for gestation and relinquishes all present and future
parental and inheritance rights and obligations to a resulting person or persons.").
162. Id. § 603.
163. Id. § 102(30).
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issues such as informed consent, donor identity, control of cryopreserved
gametes, mental health consultation, privacy, gamete and embryo donation,
insurance, and quality assurance can be addressed and resolved."'164 For
example, there are a number of provisions in the Model Act establishing
parentage under circumstances when the legal spouse of a man gives birth to
a child by means of assisted reproduction, or when a marriage is dissolved
through divorce or annulment before transfer of the eggs, sperm, or
embryos.'
66
For purposes of posthumous conception, the gamete provider is no longer
living when the conception occurs. The issue then becomes establishing
parenthood for inheritance and benefits, which is the focus of the cases
discussed in the federal and state courts to date. The Model Act specifies:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent
of the child.
167
It is unambiguous that parenthood may only be established by a clear
acceptance of the consequences of parenthood by the person providing the
gametes. Such establishment is present in Sections 6 and 7 of the Uniform
Parentage Act, but the Model Act is intended to do more than address
parentage issues. 168 The Model Act provides greater specificity as to
consent requirements, an essential element of parenthood under either the
Uniform Parentage Act or the Model Act. This issue of consent should be
considered separately.
164. Id. at Report to the House of Delegates.
165. Id. § 605.
166. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 606 (2008). The issue of the
disposition of embryos was considered in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)
(upholding the terms of the agreement to discard the embryos upon his death).
167. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607.
168. The Uniform Parentage Act establishes a parent-child relationship when a child
is in gestation at the death of the gamete provider. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2)
(2002) ("[C]hild is bom within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death,
annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce .... "). Or, identical to the Model Act,
"an individual who consented in a record to be a parent. .. dies before placements of the
eggs, sperm, or embryos ... would be a parent of the child." MODEL ACT GOVERNING
ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607.
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2. Consent to Paternity or Maternity
The Model Act provides the following:
SECTION 202. RECORD AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED
1. The provider must document informed consent in a record for each
participant that must:
(a) Be in plain language;
(b) Be dated and signed by the provider and by the participant;
(c) Include an agreement in a record clarifying, to the extent possible,
parental rights of all participants (participants not named are
presumed to have no parental rights or duties) if collaborative
reproduction is used;
(d) State that disclosures have been made pursuant to this Act;
(e) Specify the length of time the consent remains valid; and
(f) Advise the party signing the informed consent document of the
right to receive a copy of the record.
2. Except in an emergency, the record(s) must be signed by the parties
before informed consent is valid or the commencement of any• • 169
assisted reproduction.
In the context of the judicial opinions summarized in this Article, the
consent of the man cryopreserving sperm to be used to fertilize an egg that
eventually becomes a child must be clear and convincing. Taking each of
the cases chronologically, William Kane, as described in the 1993 California
decision, certainly intended that his long-time girlfriend use his
cryopreserved sperm to become pregnant. 7 ° Likewise, in the 2000 decision
of In re Estate of Kolacy,17 1 the court stated that it accepted as true the
wife's "statement that her husband unequivocally expressed his desire that
she use his stored sperm after his death to bear his children." 172 The issue in
the case is whether the alleged oral permission and direction given by the
husband would be sufficient in other circumstances, and particularly in
reference to the Model Act's requirement that the consent be in a record.
In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security,173 the father was less
than precise in his consent to insemination after his death, and the court
comments that, "a decedent's silence, or his equivocal indications of a desire
to parent posthumously, 'ought not to be construed as consent.'
174
169. MODEL ACT GovERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 202.
170. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
171. 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
172. Id. at 1263.
173. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
174. Id. at 269.
2009
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXV:332
Furthermore, "[a]fter the [provider's death], the burden rests with the
surviving parent .. . to prove the deceased genetic parent's affirmative
consent to both" conception and support of the resulting child.1 75 The court
cited the ability to preserve the gametes for a long period of time, thus
compounding the efforts to establish consent. Sufficient evidence may just
evaporate. Then, the court concluded that the administrative law judge was
justified in ruling that consent had been given adequately. The
administrative law judge's ruling was based on written statements from the
decedent's family, the wife's family, and the decedent's financial records,
which all led to the conclusion that there was proper consent to posthumous
conception.
176
Like Woodward, in the case of Gillett-Netting 77 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the federal district court and held that when a husband
deposited sperm prior to undergoing chemotherapy for cancer, he "wanted
[his wife] to have their child after his death using his frozen sperm."
178
Admittedly, the court was more favorable to establishing consent and
parenthood because the mother and the gamete provider were married at the
time of his death - an important factor in Arizona, the decedent's domicile at
death. 179 The case demonstrates that when the facts lack specificity, the
court will look to surrounding circumstances.
Another federal decision, Stephen v. Commissioner of Social Security,180
was not as accepting of consent and resulting parentage. Stephen is an
interesting decision because it involved a wife's removal of her husband's
sperm after he died of a heart attack; there was no deposit prior to his death
from which the surviving spouse could take for purposes of conception. The
court denied the mother's request for Social Security benefits that she sought
on behalf of the son bom as a result of the posthumous conception. The
court held that the child was not provided for in the decedent's last will and
testament, and furthermore, the child was not dependent upon the decedent
at the time of the decedent's death. 181 These factors, based on circumstances
other than the specific consent of the decedent, resulted in a denial of status
for the child. It was difficult to find any evidence in the record that the
husband did in fact consent to the use of his sperm for the posthumous
conception.
Making specific reference to the removal of sperm after the death of the
provider, the Model Act provides that:
175. Id.
176. Id. at 270.
177. Gillett-Netting v. Bamhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
178. Id. at 595.
179. Seeid at 599 n.7.
180. 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
181. Id. at 1265.
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Gametes or embryos shall not be collected from deceased or
incompetent individuals or from preserved tissues unless consent in a
record was executed prior to death or incompetency by the individual
from whom the gametes or embryos are to be collected or the
individual's authorized fiduciary who has express authorization from
the principal to so consent.
182
Furthermore, once collected, the gametes or embryos may not be placed
(transferred) into the body of a woman with the intent to achieve pregnancy
and live birth without a court order.' 83 Failure to observe these restrictions
will subject the perpetrator to civil and criminal sanctions.
84
By mid-2007, another interesting set of facts would arise concerning
consent. In the New York case In re Martin B., 185 the court was asked to
establish the consent of not the gamete provider, but rather the provider's
father, the Grantor of seven trusts benefitting "issue and descendants." The
posthumously conceived children who would otherwise qualify as issue
were born several years after the death of the gamete provider. If they were
considered issue or descendants they would receive benefits under the terms
of the trusts. New York accepted the "consent" to artificial insemination
between spouses to establish parenthood and thus establish the children as
issue under the terms of the trust, even though this allowed for the process of
posthumous conception to benefit someone other than the children of the
provider. 1
86
For the Martin court, the essential element was the intent of the Grantor of
the trusts: whether the Grantor wanted to include the after born children of
his son, particularly under the circumstances of posthumous conception.
The court ruled that the children should be included as beneficiaries of the
trust, stating that "the absence of specific intent should not necessarily
preclude a determination that such children are members of the class of
issue." 187 Nonetheless, even though the court was willing to allow for a
silent trust to include posthumously conceived children, the court went on to
say that children must be born with the "consent of their parent."'188 They
simply assumed that this occurred here.
182. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 205(1) (2008). Arguably,
section 607 of the Model Act applies to persons who, while alive, make provision for
gamete implantation after the provider's death. See Kindregan & Snyder, supra note 16,
at 215.
183. Id. § 205(3).
184. Id. § 205(4).
185. 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007).
186. Id. at 209.
187. Id. at 211.
188. Id.
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In the same year, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that a child
conceived posthumously could not inherit - or thus receive Social Security
benefits - under state law. 89 Interestingly, the man and woman were
married, and the husband had executed a consent form specifically stating
that the wife could use the cryopreserved sperm to achieve pregnancy and
that he wanted to be the father of the child to the fullest extent possible.
1 90
The court rejected the consent of the decedent as the determining factor.
Rather, the court held that under the terms of the state's intestate statute, the
child would need to be alive at the time of the father's death in order to
inherit, and here she was not.' 9' Consent was irrelevant when the state
statute dictated otherwise.
Finally, in early 2008, the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled that a child
who was "created as an embryo through in vitro fertilization during the
child's parents' marriage, but implanted into the child's mother's womb
after the death of the child's father," was not entitled to inherit as the father's
intestate heir.1 92 The husband and wife had undergone fertility treatments in
an effort to become pregnant, but by the time of the husband's death, the
wife had not been able to carry a child to term. Less than one year after his
death, the wife had two of the embryos transferred to her uterus and this
procedure resulted in a single pregnancy that produced a child.
The issue for the Arkansas court was not the consent of the father, but
rather whether conception had occurred prior to his death so as to comply
with the terms of the Arkansas Code requiring conception prior to death to
inherit as an intestate heir.193 Since the child was neither born nor conceived
during the marriage, the child was not entitled to take an intestate share, thus
the child was also disqualified from Social Security benefits. The court
rejected the argument that the father consented to the birth and thus the child
should be able to inherit. To so hold, the court concluded, would depart
from the clearly stated words used in the statute, requiring birth or
conception during the life of the parent, not consent. It was not within the
court's ambit to "create the law, but [instead] to interpret the law and to give
effect to the legislature's intent."'
' 94
Taken as a whole, the cases reveal that the consent to paternity or
maternity of the provider of the gamete does not dispose of the existing
situations. There is a distinction to be made between consent and
inheritance. For example, in both Finley and Khabbaz, the courts focused on
the words of the intestate statutes, rather than on the level of consent
189. Khabbaz v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1186 (N.H. 2007).
190. Id. at 1182.
191. Id. at 1184.
192. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ark. 2008).
193. Id. at 853 (referencing ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (2004)).
194. Id. at 854.
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exhibited by the provider. The state's intestate statutes must be addressed by
the appropriate legislatures. So too, whether posthumously conceived
children should be considered as beneficiaries under valid trusts when the
trust allows for the inclusion of additional "issue" or "descendants." Indeed,
"foisting heirs upon the unwilling" has long been an issue in trust
administration. But the Uniform Probate Code is willing to allow such
language to include those who would "succeed to the designated individual's
intestate estate under the intestate succession law of the designated
individual's domicile if the designated individual died when the disposition
is to take effect in possession or enjoyment."' 95 In those states retaining the
Rule Against Perpetuities, there are certainly instances when an after born
life would jeopardize validity under the Rule if that human life was a
measuring life but not a life in being. 96  The Model Act does not
accommodate the Rule and this should be a consideration.
3. Accommodation Within the State's Intestate Scheme
The Model Act, in its report to the American Bar Association House of
Delegates, states that the Act is "intended to provide the needed legal
framework by challenging the legislatures to consider the potential legal
issues arising from assisted reproduction."' 197 Many, if not most, states use
state intestate statutes that omit any reference to or may be interpreted as
disallowing for posthumously conceived children to be considered intestate
heirs. 98  State courts may allow for the inclusion of posthumously
195. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-711 (2006); see id. § 2-705 (allowing for adopted
children and children born out of wedlock to be included in classes allowed to take under
intestate succession); see also Lux v. Lux, 288 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I. 1972) ("The
ascertainment of time within which a person who answers a class description such as
'children' or 'grandchildren' must be born in order to be entitled to share in a testator's
bounty is not an easy matter. In seeking a solution, the court must seek to effectuate the
testator's intent.").
196. See Lorio, supra note 110, at 161-162 (commenting that if a life-in-being
standard is determinative for a violation under the Rule, then the possibility that a
posthumously conceived child may cause a violation is a consideration. Nonetheless, if
the state adopts a statute that treats the child posthumously conceived as being in
gestation at the death of the parent, then the child is "in being" for purposes of the Rule.
Nonetheless, it seems better for any state adopting any legislation allowing for
posthumous conception, to specifically exempt this possibility from the repertoire of the
Rule.).
197. MODEL ACT GOVERN[NG ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., at Report to the House of
Delegates (2008).
198. See, e.g., Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853-55 (holding that a child must be born or
conceived prior to the parent's death to inherit intestate and the state statute's definition
of conception did not include an embryo); see generally Woodward v. Comm. of Soc.
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conceived children, but reliance upon judicial interpretation leaves all at
risk, with only a patchwork quilt of state allowances and benefits.
Since Articles 6 and 7 of the Model Act mirror the corresponding
provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act, the solution for each of the state
legislatures, in seeking to bring their intestate statutes into conformity with
benefits to be conferred on posthumously conceived children, should be to
inquire as to whether they have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. In
addition, with the amendments to the Uniform Probate Code,1 99 states have
added incentives and model from which to choose to accommodate the
rights of the children and the intent of the parents. And since the Model Act
is meant to integrate itself into the existing acts, its three sections deserve
further legislative consideration.
The first section pertinent to intestate succession and posthumous
conception states:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent
of the child.
200
A requirement of spousal status will jeopardize the rights of children born as
a result of non-marital cohabitation and posthumous conception not included
within the general provisions of Section 603, which states: "A man who
provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as
provided in Section 604 with the intent to be the parent of her child is a
parent of the resulting child."' 0 ' Any confusion over marital status will
result in loss of benefits and delay. The proliferation of private ordering
among adults in establishing relationships other than marriage involving
property interests continues. 2° 2 And states are increasingly recognizing civil
unions, domestic partnerships and reciprocal beneficiary arrangements
Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) (holding that the best interest of the child and equality
among all children require that the state's intestate statute be read to incorporate
posthumously conceived children); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S. 2d 207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
2007) (allowing for an evolution of state public policy to allow for the inclusion of
posthumously conceived children).
199. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120(k); 2-104(a)(2); 3-703; and 3-1006.
200. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607.
201. Id. § 603. See also id. § 604(1) (requiring "[c]onsent by a woman and a man
who intends to be a parent of a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction must be
in a record signed by the woman and the man," would allow for inclusion under
posthumous conception analysis.).
202. See generally WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE 33-40 (2d ed. 2007).
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among persons of the same sex. There must be greater certainty of what is
meant by spousal status.
The second section pertinent to intestate succession and posthumous
conception involves parentage under a valid gestational agreement. It is
conceivable that a provider of sperm, eggs or embryos may direct that any of
these be used to bring about conception after the death of the provider.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that upon birth of a child to a gestational
carrier, the intended parents could seek to confirm parenthood in accordance
203with the provisions of the Model Act. The obligations, rights, and duties
under the gestational agreement as set forth in the Model Act are important
and need to be included as prerequisites for intestate succession status.
The third section involves the collection of gametes or embryos from
deceased or incompetent persons, or from preserved tissues. The Model Act
specifies that, in order to be utilized in the context of posthumous
conception, there must be consent in a record that was executed prior to
death or incompetency. Additionally, court permission must be obtained in
an emergency situation. The consent must come from the provider or from
that person's authorized fiduciary who has express authorization from the
provider to so consent. 204 Facts involving the removal of sperm from a
decedent and then cryopreserving the sperm so as to bring about conceptionoccurred .205
occurred in Stephen v. Commissioner of Social Security. Certainly the
medical technology is available, both for retrieval and for cryopreservation.
Any intestate statute must be attentive to the consent requirements pertaining
to the decedent, and the Model Act provides for this. But, in an effort to
promote certainty there must be a reasonable time limit for purposes of
conception. Already, some states place a time restraint upon when
conception may occur after the death of the provider of the gametes.
California requires that a child be in utero within two years of decedent's
206death. Louisiana requires that the child be born not more than three years
after the death of the provider of the gametes. 207 And the Uniform Probate
Code allows for a child to be treated as in gestation if the child is in utero not
later then thirty-six months after the death of the gamete provider, or born
208
not later than forty-five months. Perhaps a reasonable standard would be
203. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 707 (Alternative A)
(2008).
204. Id. § 205.
205. 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that a child resulting from
posthumous conception was not eligible for intestate inheritance or Social Security
benefits).
206. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West Supp. 2008).
207. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2008).
208. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (2006).
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more equitable, as was suggested in the Woodward decision, but proper
estate administration requires certainty at some point in time.
The identification of heirs, issue, descendants, and related class gift
designations within the context of trusts may remain more fluid. Thus,
rather than establish an objective time limit on the establishment of status
within the class, it is reasonable to allow for the class-including those
posthumously conceived-to increase in accordance with administrative
convenience. The Uniform Probate Code offers an example of a reasonable
approach to class membership in trusts when it provides that "property
passes to those persons . . . when the disposition is to take effect in
possession or enjoyment., 20 9 The effect of the statute is to allow for after
conceived and after born members of the class to enjoy the benefits of the
trust, no matter when conception occurs, as long as the class members are in
existence at the time distribution of the trust assets takes place. Plus, the
Code now specifically includes posthumously conceived children within the
class of Section 2-705(g)(2).2 1 °
4. Accommodating the Requirement of Federal Benefits
A consistent refrain in many of the cases involving posthumous
conception was the requirement that federal Social Security benefits be
dependent upon the state's intestate statute including the resulting child in
the inheritance scheme. The cases often refer to the Social Security
regulations as requiring that the child actually be a child of the decedent
from whom the benefits are sought. To make this determination, "the
Commissioner [of Social Security] is instructed to 'apply such law as would
be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property...
by the courts of the State in which [the insured] was domiciled at the time of
his death."', 2 12  Furthermore, the cases, because they rely on different
intestate statutes, provide inconsistent benefits to children resulting from
posthumous conception. It is reasonable to question whether the federal
benefits should be dependent upon state statutes when the result is to deny
benefits to those most vulnerable children.
The Woodward decision was the first to seek to identify the best interests
of the children as the deciding factor in a balancing of state certainty and the
financial entitlement of children. The court wrote that:
209. Id. § 2-711.
210. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(g)(2) (2008 amend.).
211. See, e.g., Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853-55 (Ark. 2008) (holding that a
child could not inherit under state's intestate statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a)
(2004), thus the child was denied federal Social Security benefits).
212. Id. at 852-53 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2000)).
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Posthumously conceived children may not come into the world the
way the majority of children do. But they are children nonetheless.
We may assume that the legislature intended that such children be
"entitled," in so far as possible, "to the same rights and protections of
the law" as children conceived before death.
2 13
Likewise, in Martin B., the court opted in favor of including children within
the state's statute since, "where a governing instrument is silent, children
born of this new biotechnology with the consent of their parent are entitled
to the same rights 'for all purposes as those of a natural child.' 214 These
cases clearly imply an equal protection argument for children, but more
directly, they suggest the need for federal initiative to separate federal
entitlements from state eligibility requirements.
5. Establishing Paternity or Maternity Within a Reasonable Time
The reasonableness of time restraints on the establishment of paternity or
maternity when posthumous conception occurs has been addressed under
individual headings within this Article. There are other time limitations
contained in the Model Act. For example, (1) "[a] donor who has given
permission for release of identifying health or other information may not
revoke such permission after transfer of the donated gametes or of embryos
created with the donated gametes. 215 (2) Consent to use gametes for the
purpose of posthumous conception must be obtained from the provider prior
to death or incompetency.21 6 (3) Counseling is required to be offered prior
to the transfer of donor gametes or embryos to a female intended parent or to
a gestational carrier. In addition, assessments of participants must be
provided prior to the procedures. 217 And of course, (4) binding agreements
must be executed prior to embryo creation by the intended parents./is
The Model Act further provides (5) a period of five years to pass before
an embryo is deemed to be abandoned, and only if there has been a diligent
search to notify the interested parties.2 19  The Model Act adopts the
provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act in establishing parameters for
.. . . . 220
paternity; some of these provide time limits. But the section that applies
to the parental status of a deceased individual does not make reference to a
213. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266 (Mass. 2002).
214. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007).
215. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 204(2) (2008).
216. Id. § 205(1).
217. Id. § 302.
218. Id. § 501.
219. Id. § 504.
220. Id. §§ 601-07.
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time for conception to take place in order for the child to be considered a
child of the decedent. The provision simply requires consent.
2 2 1
Posthumous conception may occur through the use of a gestational
agreement, but there is no time limit on the gestational agreement. There is
a residency requirement of ninety days that applies to persons seeking to
validate the agreement. 222 Then, "[u]pon birth of a child to a gestational
carrier, the intended parents shall file notice with the court that a child has
been born to the gestational carrier within 300 days after assisted
reproduction. ' '2 3 If the intended parents do not file notice within three
hundred days, perhaps because of the death of the intended parent prior to
conception but after the gestational agreement, the "gestational carrier or the
appropriate State agency may file notice with the court that a child has been
bom . . . within 300 days after assisted reproduction. ' '224  Finally,
"[i]ndividuals who are parties to a nonvalidated gestational agreement as
intended parents may be held liable for support of the resulting child under
the law." Clearly, the statute includes facts conducive to posthumous
conception, but greater clarity is needed to provide certainty of benefits upon
a petition by the gestational carrier or by the appropriate state agency.
6. Ethical or Religious Accommodation
Advances in medical technology allowing for the procedures described in
this Article prompt deeply held concerns by some persons within religious
communities and by others fearful of the adverse effects upon children,
privacy and the possibility of genetic harvesting.226  For religious
observants, assisted reproductive techniques are viewed as "gravely
immoral" because the techniques used "entail the disassociation of husband
and wife, by the intrusion of a person other than the couple . . . . [Also,
t]hese techniques . . . infringe the child's right to be born of a father and
221. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607 (2008) ("If an
individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the
child.").
222. Id. § 702 (Alternative A).
223. Id. § 707(1) (Alternative A).
224. Id. § 707(3) (Alternative A).
225. Id. § 709(3) (Alternative A).
226. See, e.g., Bahadur, supra note 12; Corrigan, Mumford & Hull, supra note 112
(discussing in part, the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990, which
permits staff to abstain from participating in posthumous conception on conscientious
grounds).
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mother known to him and bound to each other by marriage. '227 Often too,
there is insufficient consideration given to the embryos, and religious
observants advocate that "[e]very human life, from the moment of
conception until death, is sacred because the human person has been willed
for its own sake in the image and likeness of the living and holy God. 228
The Roman Catholic Church has "frequently intervened to clarify and
resolve moral questions" in the area of bioethics.229  In 1987, the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a document titled,
Instruction Donum Vitae on Respect for Human Life At Its Origins and for
the Dignity of Procreation. There were two encyclicals authored by Pope
John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (1993), and Evangelium Vitae (1995), and in
2008, Pope Benedict XVI addressed the United Nations where his comments
embraced the protection of the life of every human being. Consistent within
all of these pronouncements is the Church's assertion as to the following:
The origin of human life has its authentic context in marriage and in
the family, where it is generated through an act which expresses the
reciprocal love between a man and a woman. Procreation which is
truly responsible vis-a-vis the child to be born "must be the fruit ofS ,,230
marriage.
The Church, by expressing an ethical judgment on some
developments of recent medical research concerning man and his
beginnings, does not intervene in the area proper to medical science
itself, but rather calls everyone to ethical and social responsibility for
their actions. She reminds them that the ethical value of biomedical
science is gauged in reference to both the unconditional respect owed
to every human being at every moment of his or her existence, and the
defense of the specific character of the personal act which transmits
life.
23 1
". .. Therefore, the Magisterium of the Church has constantly
proclaimed the sacred and inviolable character of every human life
from its conception until its natural end."
232
227. UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
§ 2376, at 571 (2d ed. 1997) (1994).
228. Id. at § 2319, at 558.
229. INSTRUCTION DIGNITAs PERSONAE, supra note 13, at 1.
230. INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE, supra note 13, at 4 (quoting CONGREGATION
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DONUM VITAE (1988)).
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id. at 10 (quoting Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the General Assembly of the
Pontifical Academy for Life and International Congress on "The Human Embryo in the
Pre-implantation Phase," (February 27, 2006)).
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All things considered, it needs to be recognized that the thousands of
abandoned embryos represent a situation of injustice which in fact
cannot be resolved.
233
From the ethical point of view, embryo reduction is an intentional
selective abortion. It is in fact the deliberate and direct elimination of
one or more innocent human beings in the initial phase of their
existence and as such it always constitutes a grave moral disorder.23
In the context of the urgent need to mobilize consciences in favour of
life, people in the field of healthcare need to be reminded that "their
responsibility today is greatly increased. Its deepest inspiration and
strongest support lie in the intrinsic and undeniable ethical dimension
of the health-care profession, something already recognized by the
ancient and still relevant Hippocratic Oath, which requires every
doctor to commit himself to absolute respect for human life and its
sacredness."
235
Because medical technology has advanced so rapidly and so recently,
there are few specific references to posthumous conception in ethical or
religious text. Publications are readily available from religious
denominations condemning cloning and stem cell research,236 but there are
very few references to more recent medical developments. The
abovementioned Vatican documents offer the best summaries. Nonetheless,
one recent decision involved medical personnel refusing to assist unmarried
persons seeking to utilize assisted reproductive technology. Medical
personnel objected based on their federal and state constitutional rights to
the free exercise of their religious beliefs. 237 The California case involved a
233. Id. at 11.
234. Id. at 12.
235. Id. at 21 (quoting Pope John Paul 1I, Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae, 63
(1995)).
236. See, e.g., SECRETARIAT OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVITIES, UNITED STATES CATHOLIC
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, STEM CELL RESEARCH AND HUMAN CLONING:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2004), http://www.usccb.org/prolife/stemcellQ&A.pdf, Pope
John Paul 1I, Encyclical Letter The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae) (March 25, 1995),
http://www.vatican.valholyfather/john_paulii/encyclicals/index.htm; Pope Benedict
XVI, Address to the Participants in the Plenary Session of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedict xvi/
speeches/2008/january/index en.htm; Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Participants in
the International Congress Sponsored by the Pontifical Academy for Life (Sept. 16,
2006), http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedict-xvi/speeches/2006/september/index_
en.htm.
237. See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct.,
189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008). As to other objections to statutes based on free exercise of
religion, see generally Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending
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lesbian woman who lived with her female partner and sought to become
pregnant with the use of donor sperm. She met with a physician at the North
Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc., and was told that to become
pregnant she may have to use intrauterine insemination (IUI). But the
physician refused to personally perform the procedure because of her
religious beliefs. Nonetheless, the physician stated that other people on staff
would perform the procedure. As the case developed it appeared this was
not so.
There was a dispute at the time of the trial as to whether the religious
objections derived from the fact that the woman seeking the procedure was
unmarried, or because she was a lesbian. California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act did not prohibit marital status discrimination, but it did prohibit
discrimination based upon sexual orientation. 238 The physician argued that
to force her to perform the procedure would unduly burden her free exercise
of religion, but the court rejected her objections, holding the physician
bound by the state's non-discrimination statute. At best, "defendant
physicians remain free to voice their objections, religious or otherwise, to
the Act's prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination. 23 9 And it is
such objection that is contemplated by the Roman Catholic Church's call for
physicians and others to "mobilize consciences in favour of life. 24 °
When faced with statutes that violate religious beliefs, religious
denominations often seek accommodations within the statutes themselves.
State legislatures sometimes place accommodation clauses into legislation
that allow groups to isolate themselves from the provisions of an act. For
example, when California enacted the Women's Contraception Equity Act,
which aimed to improve access to prescription contraceptives, the statute
contained an accommodation permitting a religious employer to provide a
prescription drug plan for its employees that would exclude contraceptives.
Certain specific factors identified religious employers who could take
advantage of the accommodation. Catholic Charities of Sacramento sought
accommodation within the religious employer exception so as to avoid being
Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating That Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1 (1991).
238. See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, 189 P.3d at 965 (citing CAL. CIv.
CODE § 51(a) (West 2007) "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever."). In 2005, the legislature amended the Act to expressly prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id.
239. Id. at 967.
240. INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE, supra note 13, at 21.
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forced to provide contraceptives to employees. 24  But the California
Supreme Court denied Catholic Charities the accommodation, not because
they did not have religious objections to the distribution of contraceptives,
but rather because they did not come within the statute's exemption factors.
The Catholic Charities court provided a lengthy explanation of the free
exercise of religion and the requirement that any statute not expressly
discriminate against any particular religion. But the court ruled that
requiring an employer to provide contraceptives "conflicts with Catholic
Charities' religious beliefs only incidentally, because those beliefs happen to
make prescription contraceptives sinful. '242 Since many of the employees of
Catholic Charities were non-Catholic, there was no effort made to
evangelize persons who used the services, and there was no requirement that
clients be Catholic, the court ruled that any infringement on their free
exercise of religion was incidental at best.
Denied the ability to use a First Amendment free exercise argument,
Catholic Charities needed to find accommodation within the statute for an
exemption, but the court held that they could not meet the requirements
established by the legislature: "The Legislature's decision to grant
preferential treatment to religious employers who do object [to providing
contraceptives] is justifiable as an accommodation of religious exercise .... "249
In this case, Catholic Charities could not meet the elements of the
accommodation so as to be exempt from the law. But this does not mean
that statutes involving other issues may not contain an accommodation
clause. It is reasonable to suggest to legislatures that accommodation be
granted in all aspects of assisted reproductive technology for persons with
sincerely held ethical or religious objections. Both the North Coast decision
and the Catholic Charities decision are pertinent to any discussion of
assisted reproductive technology, especially as applied to posthumous
conception, a procedure that is relatively new and still prompting litigation
and statutory accommodation.
CONCLUSION
While this Article explores the current judicial, legislative and public
policy parameters of posthumous conception, so does it salute The Journal
of Contemporary Health Law and Policy on the milestone of its twenty-fifth
anniversary. The issue presented in these few pages was not formulated
when the Journal first appeared, but the radical health law developments of
241. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 74-75 (Cal.
2004).
242. Id. at 82.
243. Id. at 84.
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these past years are documented, giving witness to the continuity of change
and to the developments yet to come.
This Article identifies the dilemma of the courts and the states, to provide
certainty in an area of the law so fraught with change and competing claims
of best interest and entitlement. We have read how courts wish to strictly
interpret the statutes seeking to define a child as in existence at the death of a
parent, or as being born within days if need be. Then we have seen courts
admit that the statutes, although formulated in the past, should look to the
future, especially if that future will have as its polestar the best interest of a
child. Often the child is omitted from participation in benefits. One solution
would occur if the federal benefits were dependent upon federal standards
rather than state ones. This is a real and fruitful option. But then too, state
legislatures could enact changes to their intestate statutes, providing status
and protection to the children of posthumous conception. Specificity is
needed. To enact appropriate legislation, the legislatures can draw upon the
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, approved by the
American Bar Association in 2008. The Model Act is a significant
contribution to the field; to the overall field of assisted reproductive
technology, but also specifically to the children and providers of gametes of
posthumous conception.
The Model Act is meant to be a good beginning and suggestions are
included in this Article that would conform to the purposes of the Model
Act. These suggestions concern a time requirement and consideration of the
impact that posthumous conception would have upon trusts and the classes
of heirs contained therein. In addition, the Model Act should also consider
an accommodation for those persons who, through sincerely held ethical or
religious beliefs, are unable to comply with the procedures now available to
the scientific world.
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